COAL: STILL A DISASTER AREA McATEER/GALLOWAY

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CARTER PLAYS WITH FIRE
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OBSESSION WITH NUCLEAR STRATEGY
Alan Wolfe

HOW WE PRACTICE 'ARMS RESTRAINT'
Michael T. Klare

NATO Flirts With South Africa
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LETTERS

right *not* to speak

San Francisco, Calif.

Carey McWiliams has the gratitude of myself and undoubtedly all who were caught up in the madness of the cold war [editorial, "The Right *Not* to Speak," *The Nation*, July 23-30] not only those who suffered cruelly from the imprisonment and blacklist but those who felt that we of the Hollywood Ten were attempting to conceal something, rather than defend the First Amendment.

Now the Supreme Court uses precisely the words our attorneys wrote in their brief regarding the right of silence as being an inherent part of the Amendment. For us and for the American people, not only the hundreds in Hollywood but the thousands in the trade unions, the schools and universities, most of whom lost their jobs and some of whom lost their lives, this is a supreme irony. It comes twenty-seven years too late. One of the Ten turned renegade through fear, five have since died, one is mortally ill.

It is far from enough to be gratified with this belated decision. It can happen again. Let us hope the next time, those who collaborated with the committee, or those who kept quiet in the hope they would remain unseen, and be passed by, will now recognize how their voices and efforts might have changed the entire situation even then.

No need to mention names. Those of them who will read this will see their reflections in the above description.

Lester Cole

Union idealism

Dallas, Texas

Your editorial ["The True Coin of Freedom," Sept. 10] of a British union's ban on an enticing order for machinery for a dictator-ridden South American country calls to mind the position of the cotton mill workers of Manchester at the time of the American Civil War. Labor history gives Marx and Engels credit for the support by the Manchester workers of the Union cause though the shutting off of cotton from the Confederacy by Union blockade threw the mill workers out of work. There may be other examples of worker support of idealistic principles as against the "pork chop" pragmatism that usually dominates labor thinking. Could be a subject for a bit of research; maybe an article or a thesis. *Carl Brannin*

Schlesinger on Vietnam and 1954

New York City

As postscript to the Radosh-Schlesinger exchange concerning historians in the service of power [*The Nation*, Aug. 6-13], may I note Schlesinger's description of the 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina, in his *Thousand Days*, and my correspondence with him on the subject.

The Geneva negotiations, Schlesinger as historian recorded, "in which the United States took no part, soon resulted in an agreement to divide Vietnam at the 17th parallel. . . ." Since the Agreements did precisely the opposite—they provided for general elections in two years for a single government for all Vietnam, temporarily setting up two military zones for truce purposes—I inquired of Professor Schlesinger how he justified departing so grossly from the historical record. His reply was as follows:

"The omissions in the account of the Geneva Agreements were due simply to the need for compression in a book which was already tending to escalate beyond reasonable limits. I might add that, in my personal opinion the significance of the failure to hold elections in 1956 has been much exaggerated. So far as I know, there is no evidence that Ho had any wish to permit political debate and competition in the territory under his control."

(*Continued on page 275*)

EDITORIALS

Genial Sharper

The plain fact, which should have been clear even in Plains, Ga. last autumn, is that T. Bertram Lance had no qualifications at all for the job of director of the Office of Management and Budget. If he belonged anywhere around the White House, it was in the kitchen—that is, in the "Kitchen Cabinet" of American folklore. Back there, this swinging banker's genial sharpness might have been usefully comforting to his old friend in the Oval Office. He would have had no official function, no public responsibilities, just the duty to amuse and kick things around with the President.

Most unfortunately for him, for the President and even for the Republic, Carter chose to put Lance out front in the Cabinet-level job that is central to the functioning of the executive branch of government. What the cascade of revelations about Lance's curious history as a banker have shown up most clearly is not only in the area of ethics or legality but in that of competence. Bert Lance has been spotlighted as a conniving nepotist, easily gulled by transparent crooks when he is not successfully gulling others.

The sheer inefficiency of his banking operations is the striking thing. His speculative fortune was a matchstick pyramid held together by effrontery. An utterly characteristic touch is his putting up for sale his forty-room Atlanta mansion (called, incredibly, "Butterfly Manna") at five times what he paid for it two years ago. Speculative fantasy is his game, and he's a loser at it.

Carter has been a big loser as well. His judgment of people, along with his common sense, are now everywhere seriously in question. That he could ever have thought Lance capable of important responsibilities throws a quite devastating light on his own understanding of the governmental process.

It is now known that Carter and Lance both looked on the role of OMB director as that of "Carter's ambassador to corporate America," in *Newsweek*'s phrase. They both saw his job as one of selling the business world a bill of goods labeled "fiscal responsibility." We learn from bits and pieces in the business press that Lance has been going around among the captains of industry telling them to forget all that idealistic campaign talk, that Carter is really just a corporate good ole boy. The aim of his message which, deplorably, Carter and Lance themselves believed, was to win that elusive "business confidence" which was to cure without pain what ailed the economy. Sincerity may be an ambiguous or even dubious term but the quality itself is completely missing from Carter's Operation Lance.

Once Lance has disappeared from the public scene, which seems inevitable despite his last-minute bluster at the Senate hearings, what will follow him on stage? We can hope, first of all, that in choosing his successor Carter will prove that he has learned about sensible limits to purely personal loyalty—that a friend can be a fine fel-

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low without necessarily having the qualifications for high office. Then we can hope that this experience has taught the President something about the real nature of the OMB job.

The person who constructs the terribly complicated federal budget and who actually manages the vast enterprise that is the government must have a deep understanding of the way that bureaucratic apparatus really works (and fails to work). Lance's peculiar life as a banker and his brief experience as Georgia's highway commissioner are hardly ideal training grounds for that line of work.

The director of OMB must know its past and present in the most detailed way before he can consider charting its future. Beyond that intimate knowledge of his own organization, he must have an informed understanding of what a large bureaucracy can and cannot accomplish. The job is full of structural, technical, legal complexities. Without a broad and even learned comprehension of their interactions, the director of OMB is doomed to be just a salesman of half-digested policies, as Lance has been. Perhaps no one can master all those complexities, but Lance never came close.

The measure of Carter will come not from the way he "handles" the cleanup of this mess in his administration but from the character and qualifications of his choice of the new director of the OMB. On this score, and on the record so far, there are no strong grounds for optimism.

Southern Comfort

One lesson from the Lance affair is that the old saw, "neither a borrower, nor a lender be," is in no way honored by Georgia politics. An article by Richard Reeves and Barry M. Hager in the September 10th *New Republic* gives an astonishing account of the way that state's banks finance the highly speculative business of politics as if they were dealing in AAA bonds.

In fact, Reeves and Hager make a good case for the assertion that, but for the help of the Georgia bankers' loose practices with their depositors' money, Carter might never have made it to Madison Square Garden and the nomination. During the four months after the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Election Commission was unconstitutional, the Democratic contenders ran out of money while Congress fussed with a new law authorizing matching federal funds.

All of them, that is, except Carter. While Udall, Jackson and the others were stranded, unable to borrow much from their rigorous home-state banks to pay for their encounters in Ohio and crucial Pennsylvania, the generous bankers of Georgia were ladling out big loans to the Carter campaign. It is a joke (which the Carter camp fails to savor) to claim that the more than $2 million these free-handed bankers loaned to his campaign in that dry period was in any serious sense "secured." This home-state largesse, for instance, enabled Carter to outspend Jackson in Pennsylvania by nearly three to one.

This country is supposed to have a banking system that is national, interconnected for the general weal by such protective devices as the Federal Deposit Insurance

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Corporation and the Comptroller of the Currency. But, state by state, there are astounding variations in the habits and practices of banking institutions, as the recent bank failures in rural Texas and the strange rites of Bert Lance himself have vividly shown. The committee in the House headed by the scholarly Henry Reuss and its equivalent under Proxmire in the Senate would do well, in the Lance-inspired hearings to come, to look into how Congress might make the national banking system something more than a collection of piggy banks available to some politicians and not to others.

The Foggy Bottom Curtain

As might have been expected, given the federal government's expertise in loopholing any law, the State Department is already trying to circumvent the recent McGovern amendment to the State Department Authorization Bill. The amendment expresses Congress's desire that the Secretary of State recommend that visas be granted to all foreigners who are excludable under the McCarran Act as members of proscribed organizations: Communists, anarchists, etc. As a result of the amendment a delegation of Soviet union officials received visas two weeks ago, an unprecedented occurrence since the outbreak of the cold war.

Unfortunately, the McCarran Act provides resourceful State Department functionaries with countless excuses for barring the country's door to anyone they consider unsavory. It would appear that their first victim is to be Hugo Blanco, the well-known Peruvian peasant leader. Blanco is scheduled to begin a speaking tour of the United States this month. Two years ago, when a similar tour was scheduled, he was refused a visa at the last moment, forcing cancellation and thus making public protest moot. His application has not yet been granted this year; the same stalling tactics are in effect. But because of the McGovern amendment, new rationales have had to be devised.

A State Department spokesman said recently that Blanco is ineligible for a visa not only under Section 212 (A) (28), which refers to proscribed organizations—and to which the McGovern amendment applies—but also under Paragraph (9), which forbids entry to persons guilty of crimes of "moral turpitude." In 1966 Blanco was convicted in Peru of killing two policemen. He had been forced underground when the army smashed his peasant league, and he argues that he fired after being fired upon—at a time when the dictator's police were under orders to shoot him on sight. He was convicted in a military trial that violated most canons of judicial procedure, and during which one of his lawyers was assassinated. Finally he was freed and exiled after an international campaign was waged in his defense.

It is true, therefore, that Blanco in a legalistic sense may fit into the category of persons described in Paragraph (9). It is also true that, should the State Department desire, Blanco almost certainly would be granted a visa without his "morality" ever becoming an issue. The Department spokesman has said that political considerations will weigh heavily in the Blanco matter, and that officials have yet to decide whether Blanco's presence would be in the best interests of Americans.

Once again, then, the State Department is arbitrarily using the McCarran Act to censor—with paternal concern for our "best interests"—the political views we are allowed to hear. One of the McCarran Act's ill-advised aims was to seal the country off from foreigners with evil designs on the national security. Is it actually possible that the State Department fears that Mr. Blanco (who undeniably is a Communist) will rally this country's vast peasant population and storm Washington? If not, why should we be kept from hearing what he has to say? And finally, is it the State Department's plan in future to flout the intent of the McGovern amendment by combing the miserable McCarran Act for provisions that might apply to anyone the Department wishes to exclude? Someone at Foggy Bottom would do well to ponder what this will say to the world about American self-confidence—and about our compliance with the Helsinki Accords.

Back Where They Came From

Another depressing development on the human rights front involves boat people. These are not the boat people crowding camps in Thailand, being refused aid off the coast of Vietnam, and winning admission to the United States by the thousands. Rather, they are the Haitians who frequently set out from their island in leaky boats, with little food and water, in desperate attempts to reach the United States or some other haven. On August 15, sixty-one reached Miami. On August 10, 101 arrived at Guantánamo Bay, the American enclave in Cuba. But—and this is the depressing part—of those 101, ninety-seven were swiftly shipped back to Haiti.

A *New York Times* report by David Binder on September 1 outlined the bureaucratic conundrum posed by the Haitians. Were their reasons for fleeing political or economic? If the former, then as political refugees from the regime of President-of-the-Republic-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier, one of the cruelest and most backward dictators in the world, they are entitled to asylum in the land of the free. If the latter, they are merely hungry peasants who should be sent home like runaways—and who constitute an economic threat, because if they were admitted to the United States, how many more might try to follow?

Actually, some 2,000 Haitians have already arrived in Florida by similar means—and most remain, as do the sixty-one who had the good luck to make Miami rather than Guantánamo. The usual procedure is to jail the Haitians for a time, then free them for months or years in limbo until the nature of their flight—political or economic—is determined. But the distinction is spurious. In Haiti, even more than in most Third World countries, the political and the economic are inseparable. Haitian peasants are starving *because* of the policies that the Duvaliers, *père et fils*, have pursued over twenty years. To flee a land where not only dissent but also finding a job is impossible—is that not political?

Apparently not, when the arbitrators are State Department officials. Contrast treatment of the Haitians with

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that afforded the Vietnamese. When a fisherman from Nha Trang claims political asylum, how are we to judge whether he hates the Communists or simply views Los Angeles as the pot of gold? All doubts notwithstanding, his chances of residing in Los Angeles are good—whereas Haitians, it now appears, must provide on-the-spot notarized credentials as dissidents in good standing. In short, people fleeing from Communist countries are voting with their feet (or their oars), whereas refugees from friendly dictatorships are "illegal aliens." Criminals, in a word.

The State Department reportedly was assured by Port-au-Prince that no harm would befall the ninety-seven people who were sent back, and there is reason to believe that the assurances will be honored—at least for a time. Duvalier, sensitive to the new U.S. emphasis on human rights, has, like most Latin American dictators, enacted some cosmetic reforms. His concern for his image makes it unlikely that the ninety-seven will be summarily shot. But past experience suggests that months from now, when public concern has waned, they may begin to disappear. At the very least there is serious doubt that they will be left in peace, since even their request for political asylum is viewed as a hostile act by Duvalier and his henchmen.

Why were the Haitians returned? The State Department may have wished to avoid offending an "ally" by granting asylum, to which one might reply that the more offense given allies like Duvalier, the better. Some speculate that the ninety-seven may have been part of the price paid by the Carter administration for Haiti's support of the Panama Canal treaty. Whatever the reason, the deportation of the Haitians points up once again our political double standard regarding refugees—and offends every humanitarian standard President Carter has appeared to champion.

Civil Rights for Tongsun Park

The Korean agent Tongsun Park or Park Tong Sun (the name depending on which country, the United States or his native land, has jurisdiction over him and his alleged crimes) put the matter nicely in Seoul the other day. "I am a free citizen," he declared at a press conference, "in a free country where human rights should be respected." Note the inadvertent word *should*, for in fact the South Korean dictatorship has one of the world's blackest records on human rights. Its jails are crammed with Koreans who have dared to differ with the oppressive regime of our "gallant ally."

But the rights of Park, human or otherwise, will doubtless be "respected" by his government. If it yielded to the request of the government of the United States that he be returned to this country for trial on the charge, among others, that he engaged in wholesale bribery of members of Congress, the result would certainly be extreme embarrassment in Seoul. And the embarrassment would, of course, extend to Congress, a score at least of whose members, past and present, are said to be indictable for taking Park's money.

The Korean bribery scandal is one of the worst in our history because it involves the corruption of substantial elements of the legislature by a foreign government. It is made even more disgraceful by the fact that the corrupting nation is our client, and has played that subservient role for a generation in the interest of our strategic doctrine of resisting communism. So Congressional favors were being bought by a small dependent nation whose anti-Communist posture has long served the United States's declared policies. It is hard to imagine anything more disreputable.

The House of Representatives, where Tongsun Park's open-handed ways apparently worked most effectively, is dealing with the problem in its own way. The House leadership has hired Leon Jaworski, that pillar of the bar, to run its own investigation of the scandal after another former member of the Watergate Special Prosecutor's office quit in disgust at the dilatory ways of Rep. John Flynt's Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. Jaworski has been on the job for only a month, so perhaps it is excessive to expect that anything much would have emerged thus far from the shadows.

However, a recent vote in the House revealed that a good number of its members are made uncomfortable by the affair; that may be a good omen. An amendment to a foreign aid appropriations bill that would have cut out $110 million slated for South Korea was beaten by only 24 votes (205 to 181). A more ambitious measure, also aimed at forcing Seoul to deliver Tongsun Park for trial here, would have stopped all funds for our Korean friends. But since Washington is negotiating a $1.9 billion military-aid package with Seoul, to cushion the shock of the planned departure of the 33,000 American ground troops there, the impact would have been devastating and it was voted down by more than 2 to 1.

Meanwhile, in the ugly dictatorship of Gen. Park Chung Hee, obstacles to the return of Tongsun Park for trial are being raised in a grimly comical fashion. The country's Foreign Minister, also named Park, expressed the regime's resistance to the return of Tongsun Park when he said, "You can't just arrest a man and put him on the plane." As *The New York Times*'s Andrew H. Malcolm wrote (September 12), this statement was made precisely forty-nine months after Korean agents kidnapped from his self-exile in Japan the Korean politician, Kim Dae Jung, who dared to run against General Park in the last Presidential election and to win 46 percent of the vote—he is still in one of Park's prisons.

It is possible, though unlikely, that our government will apply the pressure at its disposal to force Seoul to send back Tongsun Park for trial. If it did so, it would risk being accused by the superpatriots of putting justice and the exposure and punishment of corruption ahead of the demands of national security—South Korea's and even our own, fantastic as that charge would be. What is more probable is that Seoul, with Washington's tacit approval, will indict Tongsun Park for some infraction like illicit currency exchange and then claim that he must be kept at home for a trial that will never really happen. Leon Jaworski, minus a star witness under oath, would thus have little to chew on, even if he had the appetite to do so. It would be a neat but distasteful end to this whole unappetizing story.

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BEHIND THE 'CAPE ROUTE THEORY'

NATO FLIRTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

PATRICK L. SMITH

Recent so-called Anglo-American initiatives in southern Africa and the mild diplomatic pressures that both Washington and London claim to have applied in Pretoria over the past year or so belie a very pressing strategic commitment on the part of the West. The issue at stake involves questions that some segments of the Western defense establishment have been wrestling with at least since the early 1970s, when the first official studies began to appear in print: what should be the nature and extent of the West's strategic commitment to southern Africa's colonial and white-minority regimes, and how can the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as the West's multilateral defense body, secure an alliance with the entrenched Nationalist Party in South Africa? What would such an alliance look like in practice?

These questions apply to the entire south Atlantic and Indian Ocean areas, but South Africa is the key to them. An understanding of their importance goes a long way toward explaining Washington's continuing reluctance to criticize South Africa with any real rigor. For considerably more than a decade the survival of the apartheid regime has been viewed in some military circles as an essential link in a global defense policy designed to place greater dependence on well-equipped and politically reliable regional partners. This view is intimately connected with former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's well-known decision early in 1970 to opt for covert support of the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia, South Africa and the South African occupation of Namibia (South-West Africa). As military, political and diplomatic factors, such views are still active in the determination of U.S. policy toward the regime.

The protection of Western interests in southern Africa by fostering "peaceful change" and "stability"—still the stated policy—has inevitably led to a desire for closer military relations between the West and South Africa, the subcontinent's strongest white regime. With its technological capability and its economic resources, South Africa in particular was ready-made for the Nixon administration's policy of regional military dependence—except that an open alliance with the stubborn proponents of apartheid would of course have to be avoided.

In countries such as Iran, for instance, the lack of a well-developed industrial economy has been an obstacle to the creation of regional partnerships. South Africa's great attraction—aside from its geopolitical position and its economic value to the West—has been that an alliance there would pose no such problem. According to a 1970 group research project headed by Navy Lt. Comdr. Beth F. Coye, published as "An Evaluation of U.S. Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean" in the *Naval War College Review*, "The Republic of South Africa, isolated from the rest of the outside world because of its apartheid policy, possesses the infrastructure for a naval establishment which could contest control of the waters around the strategic Cape of Good Hope." South Africa now has what is easily the most powerful military force in Africa, and it is largely supplied by the West.

The problem, however, was how to justify the desired close relationship with a regime that imposed on its people a system of racial discrimination so bitterly condemned by world opinion. Defense strategists could not argue plausibly for military support for South Africa in order to preserve a valuable ally from the effects of majority rule. Behind a diplomatic screen, therefore, theories were being developed to make military ties with South Africa acceptable.

Coye's lead paragraph, with its assumption of the need to "contest control," hints at much of what has come to be known as "the Cape route theory." At the time of the theory's formulation—through such projects as Coye's—the United States was beginning to implement its decision to offer covert support to the minority regimes of southern Africa in the interest of regional "stability." Other NATO countries had already embarked on similar policies. The value of the Cape route theory was that it would permit closer military association with South Africa and other states without calling for support for the white regimes against the growing "instability" caused by African liberation movements.

Rather, the theory relied on a supposed power vacuum in the Indian Ocean, on the importance of routes by which the West receives much of its oil and other commodities, and on a supposed increase of Soviet "blue-water" capability in the Indian Ocean. The theory argues that these factors combine to present the West with a dangerous threat to some of its strategic supply lines.

But at bottom the Cape route argument is no more than an elaborate justification for an increased U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean and eventually an overt military alliance between South Africa and NATO. A NATO presence in South Africa could be a considerable factor in an armed confrontation between the country's minority regime and forces of national liberation. The United States, Britain and France already have elaborate air, naval and communications facilities that stretch from Masirah, off the Omani coast in the Arabian Sea, south to Réunion, off the coast of Madagascar. In addition, South Africa maintains a large naval base and its Silvermine communications center at Simonstown, on the Cape of Good Hope—facilities intended in part to act as lures on the West.

NATO and South African facilities in the south Atlantic and Indian Ocean areas far outweigh Soviet naval capabilities in the region. That much has been made

Patrick Smith is a journalist and editor now studying international affairs at Columbia University.

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plain by at least two well-placed sources. One is former CIA Director William Colby, who has testified before a Senate Armed Services subcommittee that the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean is "relatively small and inactive." The other source is retired Rear Adm. Gene LaRocque. As director of the Center for Defense Information in Washington, LaRocque has stated that defense analysts "exaggerate the Soviet naval threat in the Indian Ocean." These estimates of actual Soviet strength in the region, moreover, were advanced before the current U.S. attempt to realign Somalia through military-aid packages. With a strategic position on the Horn of Africa and a Soviet missile-storage facility in Berbera, Somalia has served as an important argument for the Cape route theory—so important, in fact, that Kissinger, when he was Secretary of State, ignored an opportunity to win Somalian favor through arms supplies, with Saudi Arabia acting as an intermediary.

Much of what Coye's research project termed "the continued Soviet naval presence" in the region can be attributed to the Soviet maritime fleet, not its Navy. And it could be argued that the Soviets' chief competitor in Africa just now is not the West but China, with which it has been vying for influence in central and southern African nations. Short of a world war, a former U.N. consultant has pointed out, there is little possibility that the Soviets would take any steps to cut routes as important to the West as those around the Cape. Indeed, the most recent National Security Council study to be released on comparative naval strength, made public in March by Rep. Les Aspin (D., Wis.), shows that the United States and its allies have almost three times the tonnage—8.1 million—and twice the number of surface combat vessels of the combined Soviet-bloc Navies.

Despite its flaws, however, some NATO strategists have made considerable use of the Cape route theory in the years since its formulation. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, arguments ran both for and against the extension of NATO south of the Tropic of Cancer, with little action being taken to implement any new policy. But in 1972 the debate on "the Soviet Maritime Threat" reached the North Atlantic Assembly, a NATO advisory body. In November of that year NATO's Military Committee issued a report in Bonn on the need to extend NATO's influence south of the Tropic. The report also noted the need to cooperate with South Africa in any such venture. Then in June 1973, NATO's Supreme Atlantic Command (SACLANT), with headquarters in Norfolk, Va., was authorized to begin contingency planning for the protection of the Cape sea route. This was the first project ever undertaken by NATO outside its acknowledged field of operations. The strategic threat to the Indian Ocean and south Atlantic sea routes was its justification.

Although the 1973 study remained secret for some time, a group of scholars working for the U.N.'s Special Committee on the Ending of Colonialism learned of the SACLANT project in the spring of 1974. They sounded a warning against the potential for military ties with South Africa in the context of an analysis of the direction of Western defense policy as a whole. "NATO has not yet formally extended the area of its activities," they wrote. "But it has begun to concern itself with events to the south of the Tropic of Cancer. . . . A NATO command is now actively engaged in contingency planning for operations in the Southern Hemisphere. And the supporters of defense cooperation with the white regimes [in southern Africa] have strengthened their position within the system of NATO institutions. This means—it means now—involvement with the white regimes of southern Africa."

The authors also declared that these new developments within NATO were intended to preserve the status quo in the minority states of Africa, not to protect sea routes from a supposed Soviet threat. "If the white regimes begin to lose control of important areas of the subcontinent," they said, "the major Western powers will want to provide military aid on a much larger scale. . . . The effort to extend NATO would thus appear to be part of the contingency planning in the broad strategy of preventive intervention." This thesis was subsequently acknowledged in private interviews with NATO officials.



Bas, Tachydromos (Greece)

The 250-page report produced for the decolonization committee was subsequently suppressed at the U.N., largely, one of its authors said recently, by pressure from the U.S. mission and other Western representatives. But the suppression itself was a significant indication of the conscious direction some Western strategists were taking in southern Africa. The U.N. study did become public in Europe, where political storms quickly developed in several NATO countries. The SACLANT project was finally acknowledged by NATO officials in Brussels in May 1974.

NATO's apparent response to the exposure of the SACLANT study was to recommend the development of bilateral ties between NATO countries and South Africa in lieu of a single, multilateral alliance, formal or informal. The purpose to be served, though, was the same: to familiarize Western Navies with South African facilities, and to work directly with South African naval units. The same year the SACLANT study was exposed France staged a large naval maneuver off the Cape of Good Hope, and Britain held naval exercises with South Africa in August and October of 1974. These latter consisted of "weapons training," as *The Times* (of London) noted at the time, training that would benefit "both

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sides." Later that year it was also reported that Britain had been secretly planning to negotiate with South Africa on the use of Simonstown as a NATO naval base.

At a NATO summit meeting in Ottawa in May 1974, Kissinger assured NATO leaders that the United States "holds the view that events in troubled areas in many parts of the world can influence security." The extension of NATO's field of operations was the subject of the discussion. A year after Kissinger's remarks in Canada, then-Secretary of Defense Schlesinger proposed to NATO's *Defense Planning Committee* that the alliance integrate South Africa's Simonstown facility with the NATO codification system. And a report in the South African *Financial Gazette* at about the same time noted that "West Germany, easily the most powerful of the European NATO partners, is 'leaning' heavily on the British to take a more realistic approach to Simonstown," a reference to the Labour Government's opposition to British attempts to negotiate for the port's use. The information was attributed to "West German defense sources."

All of these instances indicate the degree of momentum that has been gained over the years by Western policy-makers concerned with the southern oceans, a momentum that current administrations have shown no substantial signs of deflecting.

The April 1974 collapse of the Caetano dictatorship in Portugal was a major setback to military strategists concerned with developing a Western presence in the south Atlantic and Indian Ocean areas. It meant the loss of favored administrations in Angola and Mozambique, regimes that had been supported for years, and where armed pro-Western fronts had been receiving covert U.S. aid since the early days of the Kennedy administration. It meant that South Africa was now the only feasible partner left for a Western policy of regional military dependence. And for South Africa itself, the collapse of Portuguese colonialism left a gaping hole in its regional defense structure.

Scarcely two weeks after the April 25th coup, South Africa's chief of staff, Adm. Hugo Biermann, was in Washington on a tourist visa. According to reports published at the time, Biermann conferred with the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, with conservative members of Congress, and with the Acting Secretary of the Navy at the time, J. William Middendorf II. Given the climate of developing closeness between Atlantic alliance members and South Africa, it is not difficult to imagine the subject of their conversations. More recently, NATO Comdr. Alexander Haig was present during Kissinger's second round of talks with South African Prime Minister John Vorster. Again, it seems unlikely that Haig quietly turned up in Zurich last year for the "personal visits" then cited.

South Africa has also seen a positive side to events since 1974. Its military men were clearly overjoyed by Soviet and Cuban involvement in the conflict in Angola that followed the colony's independence in November 1975. In keeping with the arguments of the Cape route theory, much has since been made of the deep-water capacity of such ports as Luanda, Beira and Maputo—although neither Angola nor Mozambique possesses ports or facilities with anywhere near the capacity of those in South Africa. Nor has either country shown any sign of offering the Soviet Navy the use of what resources it has.

Attracting the West into an alliance, though, has been part of South Africa's military and political strategy for some time. A 1969 South African defense study described the country's ports and communications facilities as "indispensable to allied naval forces in the south Atlantic and Indian Ocean areas." And Soviet and Cuban assistance in Angola has been, in that sense, an opportunity to argue openly for alliances that South Africa has obviously not missed. It is no wonder that a *New York Times* report from Simonstown in December 1975, at the height of the Angolan war, described South African military officials there as reflecting "a barely concealed joy that because of neighboring Angola the Western powers may have to accept South Africa as a full-fledged partner."

Western allies have meanwhile pressed efforts to avoid direct contact with South Africa on the military level, while still achieving sought-after support for a presence in the region. One such possibility may lie in the Republic of Transkei. South Africa launched its first Bantustan as an independent republic in October 1976, but the Transkei has since failed to gain any significant degree of international recognition. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has rejected its claims to sovereignty.

Even before independence was announced, there was talk of establishing a U.S. naval facility in Port St. Johns, Transkei's deep-water port on the Indian Ocean. A July 1976 article in the Army's *Military Review* detailed the proposal. Its author, Maj. Wesley Groesbeck of Army intelligence, argued that because of continued U.S. arms embargoes against South Africa, a facility in the Transkei would solve the problems of establishing a base in the Indian Ocean.

The official U.S. position on the Transkei—that it will follow any position taken by the OAU—should preclude such a base, but several months after the appearance of Groesbeck's article, when Kissinger was conducting his shuttle diplomacy in Africa, London-based *African Development* quoted "high level officials [who] admitted that Transkei recognition was 'under consideration.'"

Since the Transkei's independence is a subterfuge in the continued drive to preserve apartheid for the bulk of South Africa, any NATO association with that alleged state would be a big step toward the inclusion of South Africa among the nations of the Western military alliance. □



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CARTER PLAYS WITH FIRE

Obsession with Nuclear Strategy

ALAN WOLFE

Thinking about the unthinkable has not ceased simply because the unthinkable has become absurd. We no longer read popular fictionalized horror stories about nuclear catastrophe and our movies no longer satirize half-mad strategists, but in real life the contemplation of various nuclear "options" goes on. In fact there has been a revival of interest in the theory of nuclear war, bringing to Washington (and Cambridge and Santa Monica) the same kind of nostalgic reminders of the 1950s that the Fonz has brought to television.

One reason for this revival has to do with the demonstrated failure of the strategic theories of the 1950s to satisfy the political conditions of the 1960s, especially in Vietnam. John Foster Dulles, nostalgia buffs will recall, firmly believed that first our monopoly, and then our near monopoly, of nuclear weapons gave us the ability to sabre-rattle with an exhilarating freedom that no nation would dare to challenge.

It was to attack this idea of "massive retaliation" that modern strategic theory was born. Men like Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter, Thomas Schelling and Henry Kissinger, while disagreeing on the details, were united on the idea that massive retaliation was not enough. Among them they advanced the notion that we needed both strategic nuclear weapons—designed to prevent an enemy from waging war—and tactical nuclear weapons—designed to win immediate battles. In addition, these nuclear theorists agreed that nukes by themselves were inappropriate for what were then called "America's global responsibilities."

Our nuclear arsenal had to be supplemented with conventional arms or we would be unable to carry out our will. The new theory of a multilevel military strategy claimed that, instead of depending on "massive retaliation," we should consider nuclear weapons only as a form of "deterrence" while also preparing conventional forces to engage in "flexible response"—the ability to fight less-than-nuclear wars.

But, as Colin Gray pointed out a couple years ago in *Foreign Policy*, these notions, as advanced by Rand and other defense-oriented think tanks, were almost totally irrelevant to the geopolitical realities of the 1960s. First, if nuclear weapons did act as a deterrent, it was only on their *use*, not on their *deployment*. The Soviets continued to develop their arsenal; other countries joined the nuclear club, and as a result, the more weapons the United States built, the more insecure it seemed to become.

Moreover, the second prong of the strategy—flexible response—proved a disaster in Southeast Asia. True, we did have the capability to fight a limited war, but not to win one. Even worse, our possession of fantastic firepower could not prevent local insurgencies from taking place—and succeeding. Nuclear weapons could not be employed in Vietnam after conventional ones failed to attain their objectives, even though General Westmoreland contemplated their use. But this only means that we somehow deterred ourselves. Commenting on Gray's analysis, Bernard Brodie—the granddaddy of strategic theory—could only resign himself to the fact that the notions which he and his friends had advanced were indeed inappropriate in a real situation.

By the time the United States had disengaged from Vietnam, it was obvious that a new theory of American power had to be developed. James Schlesinger, who out-Strangeloved the Strangeloves, took the initiative. His basic argument was that just as massive retaliation had at one point become no longer sufficient, so flexible response had shown itself too weak. Its deterrence aspect had been based on the hypothesis that if we have, and can prove we have, the capacity to wipe out enough Russian men and women, then no Soviet leader would ever contemplate risking the use of their nuclear weapons against ours, no matter what we did with our forces on the world's fringes. Its conventional aspect argued that we could preserve our reputation as a strong and determined nation by winning limited wars.

Vietnam, Schlesinger argued, changed all this. Because we could not win our objectives there, the conventional half of strategic theory was proven illusory. This, in his view, encouraged the Russians to deploy more nuclear weapons, perhaps to the point of considering their use. (Why else would they strengthen their civil defense?) Therefore we must respond by raising the stakes.

Schlesinger's doctrine of "counterforce" was based on assumptions quite different from traditional strategic theory. No longer was the nuclear component strictly defensive, promising a retaliatory wipe-out of the attacker's population. Now we had to destroy Russia as a civilization if we were to recover from our disaster in Asia. By the time Schlesinger's doctrine was translated into policy, Donald Rumsfeld had replaced him as Secretary of Defense. Nonetheless, Rumsfeld's report for fiscal 1978 spelled out the new message: "An important objective of the assured retaliation mission should be to retard significantly the ability of the USSR to recover from a nuclear exchange and regain the status of a 20th-century military and industrial power more rapidly than the United States."

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the Schlesinger/Rumsfeld doctrine. There were three

Alan Wolfe's latest book, The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism, *has just been published by The Free Press.*

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immediate implications which it foreshadowed in the structure of America's defense policy. First, it shifted attention away from strictly *military* objectives to inherently *political* ones; it is one thing to defeat an enemy by denying him the ability to fight, another to strive for the destruction of his economy and social structure. The latter objective shifts the ground from questions of winning and losing to questions involving balance of power. Second, the new objective had an immediate *policy* implication. Rather than leading to the construction of weapons which specialists in these matters call "soft"—i.e., neither totally accurate nor totally reliable—we would have to develop nuclear forces which were remarkably precise on target and totally trustworthy. This led to a third, *fiscal*, implication—such weapons would necessarily cost a great deal more money, mean an added tax burden for the American people, and necessitate cutbacks in social services and even conventional arms if money were in short supply.

Schlesinger and Rumsfeld were repudiating the key assumptions of the 1950s strategic theory. They were arguing that things had come to the point where we had to consider engaging in limited nuclear war as a way to deter all-out nuclear war. The doctrine meant, as earlier theories had not, that Americans might have to sacrifice the good life in the interests of preserving credible power for the United States.

Both Nixon and Ford began to take steps to implement the new doctrine. Counterforce required, for example, the B-1 bomber, since it would be part of the delivery system for the fatal blow. It also necessitated replacement of the old ICBMs (considered too soft), which led to the development of the new M-X missile. The M-X is not only more accurate than the Minuteman III but also carries more multiple warheads. Finally, the Schlesinger/Rumsfeld doctrine required that the Trident submarine and air-launched cruise missiles be developed. In short, the decision of Nixon and Ford to go ahead with reinforcing all three aspects of the TRIAD—bombers, ICBMs and sea-launched ballistic missiles—reflected an underlying belief in this shift in defense strategy objectives.

Does the election of Jimmy Carter promise a move away from the counterforce doctrine? The evidence is contradictory. After all, Carter has brought Schlesinger into the administration's inner circle, where he now thunders against our moral weakness in facing up to oil shortages as he once charged us with being soft in the face of the Soviet threat. But, it could be countered, Carter's move was a brilliant one, designed to get Schlesinger into a position where he would be unable to lead an attack against a revision of his own doctrines. Whatever the motivations of both of these complex men, Carter is in an uncomfortable position. His advisers tell him that we must repudiate counterforce, for its economic drain alone could do permanent damage to American capitalism. Yet Americans have a thing about "national security," and any exposure to the charge of weakness is politically dangerous. In this bind, Carter appears to be repudiating counterforce, but at a pace so slow that it is almost undetectable.



Mahood, Punch

Weight Watchers

Carter's decision to cancel the B-1 bomber must be seen in the counterforce debate context, for without a new long-range bomber, "assured destruction" might not in fact be so assured. At the same time, greater deployment of cruise missiles would be undertaken to undermine the inevitable charge of endangering our security. Moreover, the decision to continue the development of the neutron bomb is a rejection of counterforce. Schlesinger and Rumsfeld argued that we must have the capacity to destroy Russia's industrial power. The neutron bomb would leave the factories standing. Its bizarre objective of killing people is much closer to the limited war notion of the 1950s than to the counterforce doctrines of the 1970s. Neither side in this debate has a monopoly on horror.

Since Carter seems to want to move away from the counterforce policy but may find it politically impossible to do so, he desperately needs options that can help him resolve his dilemma. For this, he is likely to depend to some extent on a recent study by the Congressional Budget Office, which sheds light on certain post-counterforce theories. The CBO is a monument to the Nixon years. When Nixon decided that the Bureau of the Budget had been infiltrated by liberals, he changed its name to the Office of Management and Budget and purged its staff. Displaced, a group of budget experts took their revenge by persuading Congress to create its own budget office and to hire them to run it. In its few years of existence, the CBO has produced a series of technical policy studies, many of which have impressed members of Congress by their seriousness and clarity.

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Although the CBO was expected to make its biggest contribution to domestic policy, its papers dealing with military affairs and foreign policy may be more significant, for they are filling a vacuum created by the devastating effect of the war in Vietnam on strategic thought. The CBO's issue paper, "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Deterrence Policies and Procurement Issues," published last April, is of particular importance.

The CBO is forbidden by law from making explicit policy recommendations, but it does not take a particularly sophisticated reading to realize what its report is all about. Without actually saying so, the report criticizes the Schlesinger/Rumsfeld doctrine as wasteful, bringing with it domestic costs that would simply be too high to bear. It offers instead three alternatives. The implications of each are laid out, and their possible costs are estimated. The result is an exercise in strategic theory and cost accounting that is as fascinating as it is macabre.

The first alternative discussed is called a policy of *finite deterrence*: the United States would maintain only enough nuclear force to respond to any attack by the Soviet Union. It is a *minimal* strategy. All that it requires is enough weapons to retaliate against nonmilitary targets, so that such weapons could be "soft." Under finite deterrence, the B-1 bomber could be canceled, the M-X missiles discontinued, and the development of cruise missiles slowed up or phased out altogether. All three components of the TRIAD could be reduced, as each is already capable of meeting the aims of the strategy. Only a Sanguine-type extremely low frequency communications system would have to be added to current force requirements.

Thus, finite deterrence has the advantage of being relatively cheap. The CBO estimates that this strategy, if adopted, would realize savings of $2.9 billion in this year alone, rising to $6.9 billion by fiscal 1982. Finite deterrence would, however, probably result in increased spending for conventional forces to make up for the gaps in the nuclear arsenal.

A second alternative is called a *limited nuclear options* policy. It would attempt to build some flexibility into finite deterrence by adding to it the capacity to engage in limited nuclear wars. It too would lead to the cancellation of both the B-1 and the M-X, since the minimal retaliatory potential against the Soviet Union could be maintained without them. But it would require funding weapons designed for a limited nuclear potential: sea-launched cruise missiles, advanced interceptor aircraft, and improved warning and surveillance systems. It would not be as cheap as finite deterrence, but it would, according to the report, produce an estimated immediate saving of $2.3 billion which could rise to $4.5 billion by fiscal 1982.

Finally, the CBO report also considers a strategy of *essential equivalence*. This position rests, not on military assumptions but on psychological ones. The report expresses its logic as follows: "To allow an opponent to build strategic forces greatly in excess of those we have . . . is to risk giving the impression that the United States lacks the capability or the will to assert its position as a world power. Our allies may doubt that the United States will maintain its role in world affairs, and their foreign policy interests may gradually cease to be consonant with U.S. interests." In order to preserve our credibility, we must continue to produce nuclear weapons, even if we are never likely to use them and even if they are strategically redundant. This means developing the B-1 and the M-X missiles, building Trident submarines, adding to the possible number of cruise missiles, but doing all of this at a rate slower than the Schlesinger doctrine would require. Under this option, the defense budget would increase but the total cost would still be significantly less than that of counterforce.

The CBO report can be used as ammunition, so to speak, in the policy debates which will emerge over how to replace counterforce. Two positions are already clear. Some of Carter's advisers will inevitably lean toward the first option, even if unwillingly, while Congress will prefer the last. The second position is untenable. While the go-ahead on the neutron bomb indicates that some still believe in the possibility of limited nuclear war, the current dominant position in the Carter administration is that any limited nuclear war would lead to a total one, making a strategy based upon the former self-defeating. (But see box below.)

The liberals around Carter—like Paul Warnke and the "class of '68" (Anthony Lake, Leslie Gelb, Richard Holbrooke and other dissenters from Vietnam)—will be important in any strategic policy debates. But while it is fairly easy to determine what they are against, it is difficult to divine what they are for. Warnke's writings are an effective critique of the very cold-war mentality that the administrations he served helped to create, but they are short on specific details. In an October 1975 interview, he suggested that American strategic policy could be reduced ultimately to two goals: the defense of American territory and the ability to "assure the security and autonomy of our essential allies, primarily Europe and Japan." We do not, Warnke argued, need a Navy which patrols every body of water in the world. Nor do

THE IMPOSSIBLE MIDDLE

On August 26, *The New York Times* reported the existence of a secret directive issued by President Carter to the national security bureaucracy. The directive tries to walk a middle course between the extremes of strategic theory. James Schlesinger would be offended by its rejection of counterforce and its concession that we are inevitably in a position of "essential equivalence" with the Soviet Union. But Paul Warnke would note with dismay its pledge to increase defense spending (by a "real" 3 percent per year) and by its refusal to concede important areas like West Germany in case of surprise attack.

Following other political instincts, Carter refuses to take a position on Soviet intentions, claiming an intense period ahead of both competition and cooperation. But what is sound politics may be fallacious in war, or at least in the contemplation of war. This directive implicitly endorses limited nuclear war. One can only hope that the impossibility of a "middle of the road" nuclear policy is never put to the test. A.W.

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we require an Army prepared to fight a protracted land war in Europe. Moreover, our air force is overextended. Warnke's position, like that of a weight-conscious dieter, is simply to reduce.

For this reason, there is more justice than one might think in the bitter charge by the hawkish Paul Nitze that Warnke would take us back to the age of Dulles and massive retaliation. Without large enough conventional forces, yet with a desire to maintain some American influence in the world, Warnke will be forced, against his better judgment, to rely on a strategy of finite deterrence, or so goes this argument. There is no other way to keep costs down to the level where they will not hurt the economy.

On the opposite side of the fence, Congress is the home of one vested military-industrial interest after another. It will be tempted to preserve as many weapons systems as possible. Congress does not as a rule sit down and debate strategic theory, but many powerful members of Congress will discover that the strategy of essential equivalence gives them an excuse for preserving pockets of influence that already exist. Interest may come first and ideology afterward, but it is only a matter of time before key Congressmen discover the need for a pseudo-strategic doctrine to rationalize defense politics as usual.

This leaves Carter, as politician, in the middle between budget-cutters on his staff and pork-barrel Congressmen down Pennsylvania Avenue. Yet here is one area where there may be no middle position. The compromise between finite deterrence and essential equivalence is limited nuclear war, but Carter has repeatedly said that he thinks limited nuclear war is impossible. With both extremes and the middle closed to him for different reasons, we are likely to see an extended period of moving back and forth from one strategic theory to another. The formation of a new consensus on strategic nuclear war seems impossible in this situation.

What is striking about this revival of interest in nuclear strategy is how few options there really are. Of the three alternatives proposed by the Congressional Budget Office paper, one is discredited before it begins, another is not so much an option as a return to a bankrupt policy, and the last is little more than a rationalization for the confusion that already exists. Thus the CBO report helps prove a point it never wanted to make: there are no serious options involved when one makes nuclear weapons the core of a military strategy.

Either one plans to use them some day or one does not; middle positions are difficult to fit into any equation. The only option offering any flexibility at all is the option that no nuclear weapons be produced—but that is one which neither the President nor Congress is currently even willing to contemplate. □

How We Practice 'Arms Restraint'

MICHAEL T. KLARE

On May 19, President Carter announced that he had adopted a "policy of arms restraint" to govern the sale of U.S. munitions abroad. The new policy contained a series of export restrictions designed, according to Carter, to help check "the virtually unrestrained spread of conventional weaponry [to] every region of the world."

Among the guidelines established by the President was a ban on promotional activity by the Department of Defense. Yet, scarcely a week after the new policy was announced, the Pentagon displayed its latest wares at the International Air Show in Paris. Billed as the largest aircraft display ever held, the Paris show featured flight demonstrations by a full roster of U.S. warplanes, including the F-15, F-16 and YF-17 fighters, the A-10 attack plane, and the E-2C early warning craft. *Aviation Week* reported from Paris that "U.S. technological domination across almost the entire aerospace spectrum has never been stronger."

If the White House had any qualms about the blatant arms peddling at the Paris show, it did not say so. Indeed, the President himself ignored his new guidelines July 27, when he authorized the sale of American weapons to Somalia, the Sudan and Chad—countries previously barred from U.S. arms purchases.

These, and related events, have called into question the significance of Carter's arms sales policy. *Aviation Week*, for instance, speculated that "the impact on the U.S. aerospace industry will be small." And most industry officials reached by the mass media expressed little fear of a drop in productivity or profits.

In June 1976, in one of his first major foreign policy statements, Carter raised what was to become a principal theme of his campaign: the uncontrolled growth in U.S. arms sales abroad. "I am particularly concerned," he told the Foreign Policy Association in New York, "by our nation's role as the world's leading arms salesman." In an obvious reference to Henry Kissinger, Carter denounced those U.S. leaders who "try to justify this unsavory business on the cynical ground that by rationing out the means of violence we can somehow control the world's violence." Insisting that the United States cannot be "both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of the weapons of war," he vowed that "If I become President, I will work . . . to increase the emphasis on peace and to reduce the commerce in weapons."

Sensing that the public was becoming increasingly uneasy about massive U.S. arms transfers to wealthy poten-

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tates abroad, Carter reiterated his pledge to reduce military sales throughout the campaign. Subsequently, upon entering the White House, he promised to make such reductions a major priority of the new administration. In his first Washington interview, on January 24, he reported that the National Security Council believed unanimously in "the necessity for reducing arms sales" and was determined to place "very tight restraints on future commitments" to U.S. arms producers and their overseas customers.

Carter assigned the task of implementing this policy to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who then ordered Leslie Gelb, director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, to develop a set of policy options for the President. Gelb naturally began his work by studying all the issues raised by the explosive growth in military exports. Most of this effort was conducted behind closed doors at the State Department and the Pentagon, but it is not difficult to imagine the major problems he considered in the course of this study:

Volume: U.S. arms exports under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program have risen at an astronomical rate, from an average of $750 million per year in the 1950s and 1960s to approximately $9 billion per year in the mid-1970s. Direct foreign sales by U.S. arms firms under the separate Commercial Sales program rose at a comparable rate, from $100 million to more than $1 billion per year. All told, the United States sold more than $55 billion worth of arms, equipment and services between 1971 and 1977, or three times the total for the preceding *twenty* years.

Recipients: Whereas until 1970 most U.S. arms sales went to Japan, Canada and Western Europe, today the bulk of such exports goes to the less-developed nations of the Third World. According to Pentagon statistics, Third World purchases rose from about $230 million per year in the 1950s and '60s to an astonishing $6 billion annually in the mid-1970s. Most of this increase is accounted for by sales to the oil-rich kingdoms of the Middle East, but a large chunk of it was bought by the poor, debt-ridden nations of Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia. (See Klare: "How to Trigger an Arms Race," *The Nation*, August 30, 1975.)

Sophistication: Not only is the United States selling more weapons than ever before, it is also selling more *advanced* weapons. Countries that were once equipped with obsolete arms required through the Military Assistance Program are now getting America's most advanced missiles, aircraft and warships. Thus Iran, which before 1964 possessed no guided missiles or supersonic aircraft, is now receiving the Hawk, Sparrow, Sidewinder, Maverick, Phoenix and Harpoon missiles, as well as such advanced aircraft as the F-14 swing-wing fighter, the F-16 combat plane, and the P-3C surveillance aircraft. (See Klare: "Arms for the Shah," *The Nation*, January 31, 1976.)

Co-production: Besides selling complete weapons systems, U.S. firms are increasingly exporting their technical expertise via "co-production" projects with foreign arms producers. Such transactions normally encompass joint production ventures involving both U.S. and foreign firms in the manufacture of a common item, or licensing arrangements whereby a foreign producer acquires the blueprints and "know-how" to produce an American-designed weapon. Many experts consider technology transfers of this sort to be more dangerous over the long run than direct arms transfers because they increase the number of arms suppliers a belligerent can turn to in wartime and also complicate the task of negotiating conventional arms control measures. (See Klare: "America Exports Its Know-How," *The Nation*, February 12).

Technical Service Contracts: Besides selling arms, equipment and technology, the United States is increasingly selling its technical military skills to foreign armies. Such transactions normally take the form of contracts for the supply of training, maintenance or managerial support. The demand for such services is growing at a tremendous rate because many Third World armies lack the technicians needed to operate and maintain the new arms they are acquiring from the advanced countries. According to one Senate Foreign Relations Committee study, more than 25,000 U.S. technicians are now working on military-related projects in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the total could well reach 50,000 by the early 1980s. The growing involvement of these "white-collar mercenaries" in many foreign armies could lead to unintended U.S. involvement in future conflicts.

Payoffs and Promotion: Given the extraordinary expansion of the weapons market abroad, it is hardly surprising that U.S. arms firms take great pains to promote sales of their products abroad. Such efforts include advertisements in the trade press, demonstration flights, and exhibits at special events like the Paris air show. In some documented cases, however, these "legitimate" practices have been supplemented by the payment of bribes to foreign government officials. Thus Northrop Corp. gave $450,000 to a sales agent who reportedly used the money to bribe two Saudi Arabian generals, and Lockheed paid out bribes of more than $7 million to Japanese officials to secure orders for its L-1011 transport plane.

Human Rights: Although the bulk of U.S. arms exports consists of major combat equipment (tanks, fighter planes, missiles) designed for external defensive purposes, a substantial fraction involves sales of police-type equipment and weapons designed for internal security exclusively. According to documents acquired by the author under the Freedom of Information Act, the major U.S. arms producers sold some 50,000 pistols and revolvers, 7.5 million rounds of ammunition, 155,000 tear-gas grenades and 296 armored cars to foreign police and prison agencies between 1973 and 1976. U.S. firms are also major suppliers of police computers, surveillance gear, eavesdropping devices, and other repressive systems. And despite the growing U.S. concern for human rights abroad, these weapons are being provided to some of the world's most repressive governments—including those of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Haiti, Uruguay, Iran, Indonesia, South Korea and the Philippines. (See Klare: "Exporting the Tools of Repression," *The Nation*, October 16, 1976.)

When Gelb first began studying these issues, Washington observers predicted that the administration would impose a permanent ceiling on U.S. arms exports at a

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Carter's Way with Congress

GREG RUSHFORD

President Carter's temporary withdrawal on July 28 of his proposal to sell seven AWACS aircraft to Iran avoided, for the time being at least, a humiliating defeat in his first serious foreign policy clash with Congress. Those of us who worked during June and July to block the sale enjoyed the victory, but the administration has resubmitted the deal, somewhat modified, and it may now gain Congressional approval. Simply put, the President suffered a defeat because he demonstrated the kind of Chief Executive arrogance and incompetence he had campaigned against. Worse, he did not take advantage of the Congressional recess to reflect on lessons learned. It appears we are in for another Congress-White House clash at a time when Carter, with more important issues such as Panama on his hands, doesn't need it.

The dispute turns on the wisdom of selling seven AWACS to Iran for $1.2 billion. AWACS is a Boeing 707 jet, packed with more than $100 million in sophisticated radar, communications and computer gear. One's opinion of whether or not Iran should get this plane depends upon one's answer to a number of questions. Is Iran able to master its technology and not risk the lives of American specialists in case of war? What of the possibility that the Russians might acquire AWACS's sensitive secret through espionage or defection? Would other weapons systems, notably Grumman's E2-C Hawkeye, better fit Iran's needs? How would Iran's neighbors react to the sale? What weight should be given to the benefit to our Air Force, which, understandably, wants to reduce its costs by finding a rich foreign buyer? Like all public policy questions there is room for reasonable debate—something we haven't had over our Iranian policy for a long time.

Nixon, when he stopped in Teheran on his way home from Moscow in May 1972, promised the Shah virtually any U.S. weapon Iran desired. The Nixon deal was a well-guarded secret, and by the time Congress discovered it in 1974, our arms program was already out of control. The key element of the deal was the solitary way in which Nixon made it, without consulting the policy-planning elements of his administration.

During the recent AWACS dispute, it almost seemed that Nixon had won the election. One Senator wrote to Carter in May to express his strong concern about the AWACS sale. He might have supported Carter if given a reason, but, instead, he received a curt note from Frank Moore, Carter's Congressional liaison, who referred the matter to Secretary of State Vance, who in July sent a brush-off note from the State Department's Congressional liaison. Another Senator wrote to National Security Adviser Brzezinski, only to receive a similar nonresponse. Finally, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd was so angered by this apparent disrespect for the legislative branch that he corralled the votes to beat Carter in the Senate.

This attitude was and still is puzzling. In the first place, it seems the President was victimized by bad staff work. The Pentagon, which had long planned to push AWACS, rushed the deal past Carter in the first three months of the new administration. When examined by the General Accounting Office pursuant to a Congressional request, the basic Defense Department studies were shown to be flawed, incomplete and biased in favor of AWACS and against its alternatives. But one staffer at the National Security Council admits to having approved those plans, *unread*, for Brzezinski, who apparently made the same mistake. The State Department was absorbed in planning new arms sales policies (which would exclude AWACS), and lacked the time or expertise to analyze the proposal. The Arms Control Agency also fell under the Pentagon steamroller. Nobody asked the CIA for an intelligence analysis of the security risks (Congress did so, but later), and the military intelligence estimates were bland and sloppy. It was May 1972 all over again.

A special word needs to be said about the CIA's role. The AWACS issue has provided the first public suggestion that the Carter administration has attempted to tamper with intelligence output. Although they had not bothered to ask for an independent intelligence report, Secretaries Vance and Harold Brown, and Brzezinski at the White House, were openly annoyed when Director of Central Intelligence Turner, in response to a Congressional request, wrote a detailed and sophisticated analysis of AWACS's security problems for the General Accounting Office. There is strong evidence from executive branch sources that Vance and Brzezinski then pressured Turner to write the GAO a second letter in July, backing off from that analysis to support administration policy. To his credit, Turner seems to have resisted such crude pressures—or perhaps they evaporated for awhile when Congress and the press got wind of them. However, according to *The Washington Star*, Brown wrote Carter a memorandum on August 29 providing reassurances on the security issue "designed to give him [Turner] an excuse to get on board" with the policy team. Such disregard for the integrity of impartial intelligence analysis is particularly disturbing from Vance and Brown, who should have learned from similar practices during the era of Vietnam, when both served under Johnson.

If Carter's aides had demonstrated that they had soberly considered all aspects of the AWACS sale it doubtless would have sailed through Congress. It must have embarrassed Secretary Vance to testify before the House International Relations Committee with Senator Culver, and realize that the Iowa Senator had turned the committee's vote against AWACS because he had a better grasp of the details than did the Secretary of State.

President Carter can stop this dangerous incompetence at once by simply insisting on a thorough policy review of the AWACS sale. But he had best act quickly. In answer to a private letter to the President in early August, signed by twenty-one Senators and asking for an in-depth study of alternatives to AWACS, the State and Defense Departments have prepared a superficial gloss for Congress. As to the study's thoroughness, the GAO informed Congress on August 26: it is "clear that the study objective is to rejustify seven AWACS." This will surely raise Congressional hackles once again, but as one State Department official who opposes the AWACS sale told me, "Look, this is the President's policy; I'm not about to risk my neck by proposing alternatives when it will do no good."

Until Carter can show that he is in full control of a competent foreign policy and defense team, Congress has the obligation to continue rejecting such deals.

Greg Rushford, a Washington-based journalist, was recently an aide to Sen. Thomas Eagleton, a leader in the Congressional fight to block the AWACS sale to Iran.

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level considerably lower than the estimated fiscal 1977 total of $10 billion, and adopt other constraints on the export of high-technology arms. Columnists Evans and Novak reported on April 18, for instance, that a cut of 25 percent or more was being talked about. But once Carter and Vance had begun to confront all the corporate and bureaucratic interests involved in the arms trade they instructed Gelb to consider more moderate remedies. As one official involved in these discussions commented, "Initially, the guidance was all predicated on finding ways to scale back on arms sales overseas. The thesis was that arms sales are all wrong, but now that has changed, and the guidance for preparing the options is fairly balanced. The people in the White House now realize there are valid reasons for selling arms."

Most analysts agree that the surge in U.S. military sales abroad is fueled by a combination of political, military and economic considerations. On the military side, Washington finds itself obliged to keep up the flow of arms to its regional deputies—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Brazil, etc.—which, under the Nixon Doctrine, were assigned the job of protecting U.S. interests in troubled Third World areas where direct U.S. military intervention was considered politically unacceptable. Economically, arms sales are seen as a major instrument for improving the U.S. balance of payments position and for reducing the costs America must pay for its weapons. Such exports are also, of course, a major source of profit for U.S. arms firms and the myriad subcontractors that depend on military orders.

These and related pressures began to affect administration decision-making even before Gelb had completed his study. On April 26, Carter bowed to enormous Air Force pressure and approved the sale of five super-sophisticated AWACS radar surveillance planes to the Shah of Iran. Two weeks later, during his first trip abroad as President, he assured America's European allies that the NATO powers would be exempted from any new restrictions on U.S. military sales. At the same time, in response to intense lobbying by supporters of Israel, he affirmed that "special treatment" would be given to future Israeli arms requests.

Despite such obvious backsliding, Carter announced his new arms policy with considerable fanfare on May 19. After reviewing the Gelb study, he declared, "I have concluded that the United States will henceforth view arms transfers as an *exceptional* foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national security interests." However, there is much skepticism concerning the effectiveness of Carter's guidelines, and one must therefore examine his concrete proposals one by one to evaluate the total potential effect of the new policy. Here, then, are all the major points raised in Carter's May 19th statement, with in each case an analytical comment.

Carter: "To implement a policy of arms restraint, I am establishing the following set of controls, applicable to all transfers except those to countries with which we have major defense treaties (NATO, Japan, Australia and New Zealand). We will remain faithful to our treaty obligations, and will honor our historic responsibilities to assure the security of the state of Israel."

Comment: During the three years (fiscal 1976-78), the "exempted" countries and Israel accounted for 35 percent of U.S. arms exports under the FMS program, so Carter has already restricted his "policy of restraint" to less than two-thirds of the potential market. Furthermore, if other countries with which the United States has "major defense treaties"—such as South Korea, Taiwan, Spain and the Philippines—are added to the "exempt" list, the scope of Carter's proposals would be

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limited by another 10 percent, to only 55 percent of the total market.

Carter: "These controls will be binding *unless* extraordinary circumstances necessitate a Presidential exception, *or* where I determine that countries friendly to the United States must depend on advanced weaponry to offset quantitative and other disadvantages in order to maintain a regional balance."

Comment: This waiver allows Carter to cancel out everything that follows when *he* determines that an extraordinary condition exists or that deliveries by another supplier create an alleged military imbalance. And as his actions on the AWACS and other cases described below testify, he is clearly prepared to interpret these exceptions in a liberal fashion.

Carter: "The dollar volume (in constant fiscal 1976 dollars) of new commitments under the Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Programs for weapons and weapons-related items in fiscal 1978 will be reduced from the fiscal 1977 level. Transfers which can clearly be classified as services are not covered, nor are commercial sales, which the U.S. Government monitors through the issuance of export licenses."

Comment: Having already chopped off one-third of FMS sales by exempting NATO, etc., Carter now reduces the force of his policy even further. Since services comprise about 40 percent of all FMS contracts, Carter has limited the scope of his controls to less than two-fifths of total sales. Eliminating commercial sales further limits the controls to only about 35 percent of all military exports. And since FMS service contracts and commercial sales are expected to rise in coming years, *total* military exports could well rise *above* the fiscal 1977 level even if Carter's proposals are vigorously enforced!

Carter: "The United States will not be the first supplier to introduce into a region newly developed, advanced weapons systems which would create a new or significantly higher combat capability. Also, any commitment for sale or co-production of such weapons is prohibited until they are operationally deployed with U.S. forces, thus removing the incentive to promote foreign sales in an effort to lower unit costs for Defense Department procurement."

Comment: These are sound principles, but they are rendered meaningless by all the exemptions and waivers noted above. In keeping with America's "special relationship" with Israel, Carter has kept up the flow of new high-technology arms to that country. He also abandoned these principles by agreeing to provide Iran with the AWACS surveillance plane—a system so advanced that CIA Director Stansfield Turner argued against its export out of fear that it might inadvertently fall into the hands of the Russians. Carter approved the sale on the ground that it is essential to Iran's security, but most industry sources agree that a major motivation behind the sale is to reduce unit costs on the multibillion AWACS program and thus ease the Pentagon's own problems in getting Congress to pay for the system. (Carter initially withdrew his approval when Congress threatened to veto the sale in July, but later announced that he would resubmit the proposal.) In yet another departure from these guidelines, Carter recently approved the sale to Saudi Arabia of up to sixty McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagle jet fighters—a plane considerably more advanced than any other aircraft now deployed in the Arabian Peninsula.

Carter: "Development or modification of advanced weapons systems solely for export will not be permitted."

Comment: Here, too, Carter has already violated his own principles. In June, he gave Northrop and McDonnell-Douglas permission to begin discussions with West Germany and several other countries on the sale of their proposed F-18L *land*-based fighter. The two firms are now producing a *carrier*-based version of the F-18 for the U.S. Navy, but the Pentagon has no plans to develop a land-based version.

Carter: "Co-production agreements for significant weapons, equipment and major components (beyond assembly of subcomponents and the fabrication of high-turnover spare parts) are prohibited."

Comment: Once again, the exemptions carry the day. According to Pentagon documents, twenty-seven out of the thirty-eight major co-production projects now underway involve countries on the exempted list, and it is unlikely that this pattern will change in the future. Indeed, Carter's commitment to increased arms standardization in NATO will almost certainly result in increased co-production work within the alliance.

Carter: "An amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations will be issued, requiring policy-level authorization by the Department of State for actions by agents of the United States or private manufacturers which might promote the sale of arms abroad. In addition, embassies and military representatives will not promote the sale of arms."

Comment: This provision is not as far-reaching as it sounds, since U.S. arms producers have always sought an informal government go-ahead signal before initiating serious export talks with foreign officials. Now such requests will be made on a formal basis, but so long as Carter is prepared to disregard his other guidelines—as in the AWACS offer to Iran and the F-15 to Saudi Arabia—this requirement does not appear particularly significant. The ban on promotional activities did not stop the Air Force and Navy from soliciting customers at the 1977 Paris air show.

Carter: "In formulating security assistance programs consistent with these controls, we will continue our efforts to promote and advance respect for human rights in recipient countries."

Comment: Although Carter has ordered token cuts in military aid to Argentina, Ethiopia and Uruguay as a penalty for alleged human rights abuses, he has opposed cuts to other countries with equal or worse records on human rights—including South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines—on the ground that U.S. national security precludes any diminution of American aid. Furthermore, while sales of police-type gear to a few dictators have been held up by the State Department, the United States continues to supply such hardware to many other repressive regimes.

Carter: "I am initiating this policy of restraint in the full understanding that actual reductions in the worldwide traffic in arms will require multilateral cooperation.

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Because we dominate the world market to such a degree, I believe that the United States can, and should, take the first step. However, in the immediate future, the United States will meet with other arms suppliers, including the Soviet Union, to begin discussion of possible measures for multilateral action."

Comment: Carter is right that reduction of the international arms traffic will require cooperation among the major supplying nations. But it is hard to imagine how he can persuade other nations to reduce their sales when the United States continues to dominate the market to such a great extent, even *after* Carter's guidelines are taken into account. And what "first step" is Carter talking about?—the AWACS sale to Iran, the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, the F-18L sale to West Germany?—surely these decisions are not going to persuade European suppliers—or Moscow—of Washington's intention to cut back on its exports to major foreign markets.

Having commented on what is covered by Carter's new arms sales guidelines, it is important to consider what is *not* covered. The first and most obvious omission is a serious commitment to reduce U.S. military sales. Even if Carter makes a significant cut in weapons transfers to the nonexempt nations, the *total volume* of U.S. deliveries will probably remain at about the same level as it was before—especially if, as predicted, sales of technical services rise fast enough to make up for the drop in sales of hardware.

Similarly, Carter has not come forward with the "very tight restraints" on future sales that he promised in his press conference of January 24. True, he has ordered the State Department to establish procedures for screening the promotional activities of U.S. arms firms, but there is nothing in the May 19th guidelines (or in Carter's subsequent behavior) that suggests such measures will constitute "very tight restraints."

Of the specific problem areas which Carter *does* address—co-production, human rights and the sale of advance munitions to underdeveloped countries—we have seen that his proposals are vague, incomplete and sometimes inconsistent. But there are some which Carter neglected to consider altogether, including:

Technical service contracts: Carter specifically exempts service contracts from his May 19th guidelines, and nowhere else is there any sign that he plans to restrict or control the proliferation of "white-collar mercenaries."

Payoffs: Although Carter calls for advance State Department screening of overseas promotional activities by U.S. arms firms, there is no ban on the payment of commissions or fees to agents and representatives abroad—and thus no specific measure to prevent further payoffs in connection with arms deals.

Undelivered orders: Some critics of the arms trade have suggested that Carter apply the new export guidelines to the $32 billion worth of arms that were sold during the Nixon and Ford administrations but have not yet been delivered. This issue is not raised in the May 19th statement, however, and *The New York Times* reported on May 8 that Carter had apparently decided to go through with these sales because Washington cannot "renege" on such contracts—even though he *has* called upon France and West Germany to cancel *their* contracts for the sale of nuclear reprocessing plants to Pakistan and Brazil.

All this suggests that Carter's "policy of arms restraint" amounts to little more than "business as usual." Perhaps there will be a slight reduction in the overall volume of sales, and an attempt to discourage extravagant purchases by some of the more ambitious Third World spenders like Iran, but in general we will be seeing a continuing flow of advanced U.S. arms to an ever growing number of countries abroad. □

COAL: STILL A DISASTER AREA

J. DAVITT McATEER and L. THOMAS GALLOWAY

In 1969 Congress enacted the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, the toughest safety and health law in the country's history. In the years since the Act has been in effect, the hopes it raised have been dashed, the promise of improved health and safety remaining largely unfulfilled. Coal mines are still America's most dangerous work places.

The reasons for the failures are many, but a major factor has been the people selected during the Nixon-Ford years to administer, interpret and enforce the law. The Carter administration could have changed that situation by now, but it has done little, leaving the high-level positions in the hands of "acting" personnel.

Like most other safety legislation, the 1969 Act followed a major disaster—the explosion of the Consol No. 9 Mine in Farmington, W. Va. Even so, the legislation ran into stiff White House opposition, and Nixon signed the bill only after miners threatened a nationwide strike. His administration's lack of enthusiasm for mine safety, as shown by his threatened veto, continued into the implementation of the legislation. A month after the Act become effective, the able, tough Bureau of Mines director who was to have overseen its enforcement was dismissed by the White House on twenty-four hours' notice.

After six months during which one nominee for the

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vacant post was withdrawn because of Congressional protest that he was unqualified, Nixon appointed an engineer with little interest in health and safety. This new chief safety-enforcement officer publicly assured the industry that he did not think various sections of the tough new law called for vigorous enforcement. The tone was thus set for lax administration and enforcement of the new law.

Industry was pleased, but men continued to suffer injury and to die at an appalling rate, and Congress became increasingly disturbed by the failure to enforce mine health and safety regulations. On December 30, 1970, the Finley Mine in Hyden, Ky. exploded, killing thirty-eight men. As a result of this disaster and the continuing clamor by various Senators and Congressmen about the lack of inspections and the low civil penalties, safety and health enforcement matters were separated from the Bureau of Mines. A new agency, the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA), was created within Interior.

The agency's name changed, but Nixon saw to it that the lax enforcement would continue. He chose as the first administrator of MESA James M. Day, a former Republican county chairman of Arlington, Va., who had little experience in coal mine safety. Under pressure from the United Mine Workers the Senate balked at the nomination. The White House refused to withdraw Day's name, and he served one year as a virtual lame-duck acting administrator. Enforcement of the Act continued to drift; for all practical purposes the agency was leaderless.

Political cronyism was not restricted to the top position in the mine safety bureaucracy. Ed Failor took over as head of the office charged with collecting fines for violations of the Act. He had no experience in mining, and was apparently appointed in return for his work as campaign director for the GOP stalwart, Clark MacGregor. His previous employment included one term as a municipal judge in Dubuque, Iowa, and lobbyist for the Iowa Association for Coin-Operated Laundries.

The fines assessed by Failor's office would not have financed a week's wash. They amounted to less than 3¢ per ton of coal mined. In fact, the program was so carelessly designed and administered that a federal court struck down even these small fines as being arbitrary and capricious.

The Interior Department and mine safety were popular resting places for other Nixon campaign supporters. John Ehrlichman attempted to place a political protégé as head of the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) to replace a previous political appointee who had fallen from favor. However, this move was so crass that the usually somnolent Civil Service Commission rejected the appointee. James P. Richards, formerly a Nixon campaign official in Colorado, ultimately filled the position, a key office in interpreting the new law.

While director of OHA, Richards also sat as an ex officio member of the Board of Mine Operations Appeals, the Secretary of the Interior's final voice in mine safety matters. During its six years of operation, the board became a political dumping ground. The chief judge of the board had been the legislative assistant to Republican Sen. Len B. Jordan of Idaho, and before that a two-term member of the Idaho House of Representatives. He had no connection with coal mining or any known commitment to coal mine safety.

No board member had any previous experience in coal mine safety law or in coal mining, notwithstanding the fact that the board must constantly decide complicated technical issues of mine safety. Nor were any of the members outstanding in administrative law or procedure. By and large, they were simply politically active Republicans who were being rewarded for their efforts and connections with well-paying sinecures for life.

The board has continually ruled against the miners' interests, opting for crabbed and often illogical interpretations of the Act. For example, in one of its most shortsighted rulings, the board has refused to allow federal inspectors to close a mine unless there is a 50 percent chance that a man will die or suffer serious injury—hardly the criterion Congress had intended in 1969.

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In addition to the political cronies, appointments have gone to persons with long-standing ties to industry or a strong industry bias. Secretaries of Interior have historically been pro-industry, possibly the most extreme example being Rogers C.B. Morton, Nixon's second Secretary of the Interior, whose brother sat on the board of the Pittston Coal Co., one of the nation's largest producers.

Kent Frizzel, a Kansas Republican who lost his gubernatorial race in 1970, was in the number-two spot at Interior for a substantial time. Known to be one of the coal industry's strongest supporters, he improperly censured an administrative law judge for raising penalties against an operator, and reversed a decision imposing liability on independent contractors who break the law at coal mines. Frizzel appointed Fred Karem, a lawyer with no mining experience, as political watchdog on the Scotia Mine Disaster investigation panel. Karem, formerly a staff aide in the Nixon White House and an assistant to former Kentucky Gov. Louis Nunn, was reported by the *Mountain Eagle* (Whitesburg, Ky.) to have ties to Kentucky coal operators, mainly through soliciting campaign contributions for Governor Nunn.

Another appointee, the assistant secretary for Energy and Minerals, who supervised mine safety enforcement, was criticized as follows by the Carter transition team for hindering mine safety efforts: "In the past four years, the assistant secretary has not supported the [MESA] program and has delayed or obstructed efforts to improve mine safety programs. . . ."

The revolving door between government and industry has not been used exclusively by those in high-policy positions; it has been open also to the middle and lower echelons of the mine safety bureaucracy. Common Cause, in a recent study of conflict of interest in the executive branch, "Serving Two Masters," points out that, "Three Assistant Administrators in the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration came from copper or coal mining companies, one of which has received a special subsidy from the Bureau of Mines." In January, one of these three left government employment to become a vice president for Pittston Coal Co.

The same pattern has developed for lawyers charged with representing MESA in the courts and before the board. The top safety lawyer recently resigned to accept a position with the American Mining Congress, an industry lobbying organization. Rank and file lawyers come to the office for a few years, learn the trade, and then depart to the coal companies. After one year, the law permits them to handle health and safety matters for the companies with their old friends at the solicitor's office. Recently, two lawyers left the office to take employment with Old Ben Coal Co., one of the most litigious companies and with one of the worst records for compliance with the federal law. Another former MESA lawyer currently represents the National Independent Coal Operators Association, a bitter if not fanatical opponent of the 1969 Act and its requirements. Yet another MESA lawyer left to monitor the surface mining works for the American Mining Congress.

While all this political maneuvering and job-hunting was taking place, more than 1,000 coal miners died of work-related causes. Since 1970, an estimated 125,000 miners have been injured. And, according to the UMWA, 2,500 miners have died of black lung, and seventeen out of every 100 working miners have contracted the disease. Each year a working miner faces a one-in-eight chance that he will suffer an injury.

And the major disasters continue:

Hyden, Ky. Finley Coal Co.	Dec. 30, 1970	38 killed
Buffalo Creek, W.Va. The Pittston Group	Feb. 26, 1972	125 killed
Blacksville, W.Va. Consolidation Coal Co.	July 22, 1972	9 killed
Itmann, W.Va. Consolidation Coal Co.	Dec. 16, 1972	5 killed
Scotia, Ky. Blue Diamond Coal Co.	Mar. 9-11, 1976	28 killed
Tower City, Pa. Kocher Coal Co.	Feb. 27, 1977	7 killed
St. Charles, Va. P. & P. Coal Co.	July 7, 1977	4 killed

Meanwhile, the penalties paid for violations of the Act have remained less than 3¢ a ton, and American coal mines continue to be among the most dangerous work places in the Western World.

The Carter administration came to power with an opportunity to effect radical changes in coal mining safety. The President and his Secretary of the Interior, Cecil Andrus, must fill a number of positions that will have a direct bearing on safety in the mines. Many of these positions are in the hands of lame-duck holdovers. The top job, administrator of MESA, awaits a final appointment; the number-one safety lawyer job is still vacant. Until these and other key positions are filled—with qualified and dedicated persons—the administration is vulnerable to the charge of indifference to the miner's lot. □

LETTERS (*Continued from page 258*)

The distortion involved is no small matter. The Kennedy administration, which Schlesinger served, initiated the introduction of U.S. troops into South Vietnam, more than 10,000 in the guise of military "advisers," in order to secure the permanent division of Vietnam, thereby violating both the Geneva Agreements and the U.N. Charter proviso against internal intervention and disruption of territorial integrity. Our representative at Geneva, Under Secretary of State Walter B. Smith (we did have one), pledged there that the United States would not disrupt the Agreements, explicitly stating that we would not disrupt Vietnam's territorial integrity, in conformity with our obligations under the U.N. Charter.

To cover its lawless conduct, the Kennedy administration initiated the myth that the Geneva Agreements provided for two Vietnams, and throughout the war the myth persisted; Americans were told they were defending South Vietnam from North Vietnamese "aggression" in violation of the Agreements. Professor Schlesinger engraved the myth in his history, pleading space requirements and his own *belief* concerning Ho's intentions. Strange reasons for historical distortion!

True, in the latter stages of the war Professor Schlesinger came to oppose it and did some yeoman service in the struggle against it. Like many liberals, he realized that the political and financial cost of waging it successfully would be too great. His mutilation of the historic record is not rescued thereby.

Max Gordon

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UNIONS ON THE BRINK

Death Wish Among the Teachers

LOIS WEINER

The Bakke case, in which the California Supreme Court ruled that racial quotas are unconstitutional, appeared to be the most important issue facing the convention of August 15 to 19 in Boston of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). Indeed, the AFT leadership successfully encouraged this impression, picked up by the national press, by including a copy of its pro-Bakke *amicus curiae* brief (the case is now before the U.S. Supreme Court) in each delegate's registration materials. But the real story at the convention was the topic not discussed: the union's, and public education's, desperate condition.

This past year AFT lost some 10 per cent of its membership, mostly to layoffs, and its rival, the National Education Association (NEA), suffered an even greater loss, both proportionally and in real numbers. At least 250,000 experienced teachers are jobless because of education's fiscal strangulation; those still employed have survived the cuts at the cost of salary freezes, loss of benefits, and a deterioration in teaching conditions. Many school districts teeter on bankruptcy; some ended the 1976-77 school year weeks, even months, early to avoid collapse.

These gloomy facts—and the dehumanizing reality of cutbacks that have made schools more like prisons than ivory towers—were acknowledged from the convention podium only once, when Vice President Mondale addressed the audience, defending the administration's commitment to education. The convention spent not a single hour considering the union's devastating losses. The crisis in funding arose only in the context of other topics, like desegregation and a dues increase.

The AFT, an AFL-CIO affiliate which represents teachers and aides in most major cities, is considerably smaller than the NEA, but it provides the political leadership of the teacher movement. While the NEA functions in many ways like an independent union, negotiating contracts and conducting strikes, it prides itself on being a professional organization, like the American Medical Association, separate from and on occasion even hostile to organized labor.

The NEA's confusion about its social role is exacerbated by a suffocating bureaucratic structure that prevents it from exerting dynamic leadership. For example, while its July convention of some 10,000 people voted to organize paraprofessionals—as the AFT has done for years—it also voted to prohibit them from holding elected office. Similarly, the NEA opposed construction of the B-1 bomber (which the AFT extolled through the AFL-CIO's lobbying) because it robbed education of federal dollars; but the NEA is silent on unemployment and its calamitous financial and social effects on education.

NEA's leadership regularly takes political positions more liberal than those of the AFT, the most recent case being its opposition to the Bakke ruling. It manages to do this, not because its membership is more to the Left but because the organization is more bureaucratic and its constituency more passive. In fact, its members, many of whom are still registered Republicans, would be horrified if the NEA leadership seriously acted upon its verbal support for affirmative action programs based on racial quotas.

Ten, even five years ago, the AFT scored easy organizing victories over an NEA that still opposed collective bargaining as "unprofessional." However, the NEA has changed considerably in five years and as it behaves more like a union the AFT has less chance to grow at its competitor's expense. As a result, three years ago both leaderships felt significant rank-and-file pressure for a national merger, but that prospect has been blocked for the present by the demoralization pervading the entire movement. So while both organizations suffer devastating defeats at the hands of school boards and state governments, they continue to raid each other to offset the membership losses from layoffs.

Now the AFT is taking this internecine struggle one step further: this year's convention approved a constitutional amendment that allows the union to organize noneducational employees, thus thrusting it into competition with general public employee unions. This scramble for new dues payers typifies the AFT leadership's method of coping with the union's problems.

At the union's helm is Albert Shanker, president of the New York City local, the AFT's largest, with 55,000 members. Shanker is also president of the national union, and a member of the AFL-CIO Executive Council. He is given credit by most union activists for the AFT's spectacular growth in the 1960s and its emergence as a powerful political force, in New York and elsewhere.

But just as Shanker is credited with the union's expansion, so is he now held responsible for its crisis; it was Shanker who shaped the AFT's political and social strategy. He views the union movement as a special-interest group whose concerns are separate from and sometimes opposed to those of the rest of society. This perspective, which he shares with most of the AFL-CIO bureaucracy, dictates that labor defend its own members —and other people—only when their concerns happen to coincide.

This viewpoint not only encourages the popular conception that big business and big labor are society's equal, twin ills, but also isolated the unions from their natural allies, and worse, sets them at one another's throats. As labor turns from its obvious role of championing the struggles of those who face poverty and discrimination, it collides with its true friends: racial minorities, women, environmentalists, peace activists.

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Special-interest unionism has led the AFT into excruciating battles against other unions. Has New York City's budget been mauled? Then press Albany for a Stavisky bill, to protect education's share at the expense of other municipal services. Is the Carter allocation for social services pitifully inadequate? "The first money should go to education," Shanker proclaimed in his state of the union address. Instead of turning *to* other unions with a call for cooperation and united action, Shanker has turned *on* other unions, using the AFT's flagging political muscle to shove competitors aside.

Because the AFT has failed to organize community, labor and parent support in a national movement to save public education, it has been forced to take on school boards and state legislatures individually, retreating with each new contract. By trading away supply budgets for salary, class size maximums for fringe benefits, the union has depreciated its moral capital and deserted its potential parent and student following.

Albert Shanker today could announce plans for a campaign to fulfill the AFT's stated goal of taxing the corporations to pay for quality education for every American child. The union could start petition drives, organize local meetings in schools, mobilize for a national one-day work stoppage to demonstrate the AFT's commitment to save the schools. This program is within the union's capabilities at this moment. However, such a course would engage the union in battle with America's corporate rulers, and that is one fight which Shanker and the rest of labor officialdom have no desire to lead. On the contrary, they are content to remain junior partners in American corporations' drive for world hegemony. The B-1 bomber does, after all, accomplish more than provide jobs in the defense industry.

The absence of such a strategy so paralyzed the convention that it could not even discuss the union's proliferating defeats. A delegate from Kansas City, whose local had experienced a brutal strike this spring, summarized his and the union's confusion while describing the strike: "You really learn who your friends are—and they're not who you think they are." Seventy-five percent of the City Council had been backed by the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education (COPE); the Mayor was elected as "labor's candidate"; four school board members had AFT endorsement. Yet every board member voted to fire 200 custodians and janitors who had honored the teachers' lines; and none of the "friends of labor" protested the firing of some 180 tenured teachers and the jailing of dozens more.

In city after city Democrats and occasionally Republicans who had been elected with the help of AFT money and precinct workers, turned on striking teachers, firing, jailing, fining them for fighting for the budget increases promised during the campaigns. The union's political plan contains no solution to this alternation of pledges and betrayals.

Shanker answered the convention's unspoken disillusionment with this course by stating that the union must resign itself to more defeats, with the consolation that conditions could be worse. "We will always be in this position," Shanker reported, and besides, "we've come through darker days." At each convention the delegates are exhorted to push harder for COPE and labor's "friends." Last year the convention endorsed Carter, and this year Shanker informed the New York City delegation that the union would be "pushing Beame."

Shanker attributed Carter's margin of victory in many states to the AFT's efforts. Nevertheless, the administration's performance has been so disappointing that it could be defended only by comparing it to that of Ford. In fact, had the AFT not succeeded through Congressional lobbying in almost doubling Carter's allocation for education and changing the terms of the aid, urban school systems might have collapsed in all but name. Still, Shanker maintained, the "tremendous difference" between Carter and Ford justified the union's course of choosing the lesser evil. Actually, delegates could deduce from the Kansas City report that lesser-evil politics is a self-defeating strategy. As long as the union shrinks from leading an independent political and social movement, it can be certain that its lesser-evil candidates will grow progressively worse.

The AFT ranks have never been less enchanted with their leadership, nor readier for an opposition, but Shanker's foes are as weary as his followers. The little agitation that did occur at the convention focused on opposing the Bakke decision and trying to force a stronger pro-busing stance. Unfortunately, the leaders of both fights divorced these issues from the root problem: that the union's self-conception pits it against its friends and leaves it defenseless against its enemies. Thus none of the oppositionists ever answered one delegate's remarks during the Bakke floor fight: "Some minority groups just don't understand that there are other minorities—and we've had to work our way up from the bottom, and we don't want to give it up. We're not going to give it up either!"

Though the arguments against racial quotas were usually posed in lofty constitutional and moral terms, the sentiment, "It's us—or them," hung over the entire discussion and determined its outcome. The union split very much along racial lines with delegates from locals with a high proportion of black members voting against the majority, those teachers who represented predominately white locals. The danger of this division was not lost on the union leadership. Shanker cautioned both his home local and the national caucus to avoid inflammatory statements during the debate. New York City delegates were especially aware that the shift of forces within the union and society has made the alliance between their white, heavily Jewish base and the increasingly black metropolitan locals fragile indeed.

Boston, New Orleans, San Francisco and Philadelphia teachers may go on strike this fall, and everywhere negotiations next spring promise to be even more grueling than those this year. Teacher unionism and public education can look for worse days ahead unless union activities connect the lessons of the AFT's and the NEA's economic and political defeats to the vision of a transformed labor movement. □

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

The Elusive Trilling (Part II)

MARK SHECHNER

The first part of this essay appeared in last week's issue.

A review of some of the commentary on Trilling by his contemporaries leads one to conclude that Trilling's mind was one of those to which it is difficult to give assent without bouts of irritation and distrust. Yet from the tone of the eulogies that have followed his death it would be hard to know that his ideas encountered much opposition in his lifetime—and not just from New Critics, unrepentant Stalinists and unredeemed liberals—and that his voice was one of the more tormented, ambiguous and elusive of the postwar period. Recent efforts by Steven Marcus [*New York Times Book Review*, February 8, 1976] and Quentin Anderson [*The New Republic*, April 23, 1977] to press the claim for Trilling's moral heroism give the impression that his greatest achievement was to embody a kind of clearsighted resistance—to be a leading stoic, a spokesman for "moral realism" and the conditioned life, and an expert in admonition who was instrumental in setting a wayward literary culture to rights in the 1940s and 1950s. "To my mind," says Marcus, "Trilling's spiritual heroism was in large part bound up with his exigency and his minimalism—his ability to affirm, without illusions, qualities and virtues that his own group, his own culture, his own audience, had largely given up on as being at once excessive in their demands upon us and insufficient in the gratifications they return."

It does appear that Trilling is at present best remembered among the New York intellectuals largely for his resistances, his antagonism to the articles of progressive faith held dear by his own literary culture: Stalinism, liberalism, the emphasis placed upon "authenticity" by the counterculture of the 1960s. If there is meaning beyond the obvious to the witticism that cosmopolitanism is the Jewish parochialism, the remark has particular application to Trilling, whose brand of cosmopolitanism was resolutely parochial after its own fashion, not only in its exaggerated regard for Bloomsbury manners but in Trilling's general preference for defining himself by negatives. He set himself against the grain of avant-garde ideas, casting out those areas of modern thought of which he could not approve. Here was a cosmopolitanism with a stringent sense of limits and a habit of being old-fashioned in the name of the higher Hegelian syntheses.

If Edmund Wilson is the model of the cosmopolitan intellectual for our time, it is plain how much broader was Wilson's range than Trilling's, and how much more vigorous and adept his grasp. To consider modernism, one of the few areas in which their overlap is significant, is to think of Wilson's pioneering *Axel's Castle* and Trilling's essay, "On the Teaching of Modern Literature," and to observe the difference between a catholic imagination and a scrupulous one, an imagination of enthusiasm and one of measure and concern. To place this penchant for disapproval in its best light, we might say that Trilling was a master of negation whose contribution to discourse in America was a brilliantly dialectical style of setting "the self" against the *Zeitgeist*, even while taking full advantage of its influence.

But, as Trilling was at pains to point out in his studies of writers divided against themselves, such oppositionism arises out of an inner need and reflects a mind in contest with itself. And it is as such interior quarrels that his own stands against the spirit of the age come most clearly into view. There is no outstanding virtue let alone moral heroism to devil's advocacy where nothing is risked or where the positions set forth are not attempts to resolve internal tensions by giving them over to formal expression. Trilling's case against the liberal imagination, which sustained him ideologically through three books: *E.M. Forster*, *The Middle of the Journey* and *The Liberal Imagination*, was nothing if not the fallout of his efforts to unburden himself of the vestiges of his own beleaguered liberalism and to justify to himself his waning interest in the ruling passion of his generation: social justice. For if the organizational and ideological facets of liberalism could be quickly dispensed with in the 1940s, the lingering claims of conscience, such as they were, could not, and it was largely for reasons of self-exhortation that Trilling's accounts of the 1930s portrayed it as so brutal, rigid, and soul-deadening an age.

Trilling held the liberal era to be not only the birthplace of the intellectual class, as we now understand it, but also the scene of its original sin. Indeed, the liberal era in Trilling's view was a time of profound moral failure, and he adverted to it in his introduction to Tess Slesinger's *The Unpossessed* with a peculiar loathing, remembering above all "the dryness and deadness that lay at the heart of [the liberals'] drama and that they had brought to the fore a peculiarly American dessication of temperament." Such views not only lacked any hint of fondness for the moral conflicts of his own youth but repressed all memories of such social realities as the depression, unemployment, the vicious labor battles, the advances of fascism in Europe, and the pervasive belief in the exhaustion of American, and indeed, Western, institutions. What remained was a movie of the 1930s starring the self-deceived and self-destroying intellectuals themselves and consequently dominated by its ideas of itself rather than the circumstances that made those ideas, at least to some, seem important.

I think Marcus and Anderson mistaken in viewing Trilling's efforts at redeeming liberalism by the infusion of tragic views, stoic ethics and complicating ironies as fundamentally the expression of his running feud with Stalinism, since it is Trilling's feuds with himself that gave his arguments their intellectual vitality and account, I believe, for their continuing influence. Such popularity as *The Liberal Imagination* retains depends less upon the positions for which it is now difficult to muster any enthusiasm as it does upon the show of competing ideas in a mind that was learning how to draw strength from its own ambivalence and from a style of thought that successfully subordinated its tensions to an overarching grace of intellect. The book's initial importance in the 1950s, I think, was similarly based.

As to Anderson's belief that *The Liberal Imagination* was a salutary corrective to a liberalism that, in 1950, was strongly tinged with Stalinism, the fact

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was that American Stalinism had already been gutted politically and its organized ranks so thoroughly infiltrated by the FBI that it had ceased to be very interesting to anyone save those who were condemned to rehearse the old battles and the gathering ranks of professional anti-Communists who were tuning up the crusade for loyalty that was to mark the decade. As a force to be dealt with in American politics, liberalism had performed so miserably behind Henry Wallace in 1948 that it was hardly on the map except as a dim remembrance of things past. It is difficult to imagine how, in such an atmosphere, *The Liberal Imagination* could have become doctrinal to a generation of literary intellectuals, as it did, were there not something more to contend with than just the feeble remnants of Stalinism in politics and Socialist Realism in art.

In fact, the book's importance did not lie in its demonstration of how the last nail could be driven into the coffin of progressive ideas—others would do that with less torment and greater efficiency—but in how intellectual and political energies that could no longer be released through social thought or action could be sublimated into higher planes of sensibility.

What made *The Liberal Imagination*'s call for the transcendence of socially defined versions of reality attractive was the palpable urgency of the conflicts that smoldered beneath the repose of style and coolness of doctrine, the shadow of powerful emotions being held in check and turned magically into limpid phrases and fine ideas. It was the emotional alchemy that was gripping, the transmutation of the lead of inner contradiction into the gold of literary intelligence. The retreat from the boldness of social rhetoric toward "ideas in modulation" would scarcely have qualified as a serious appeal to Left intellectuals were not the compensations of interpretive boldness offered in exchange, and did not Trilling's obvious vigor of mind seem to surpass that of those stymied intellectuals after whom Slesinger's *The Unpossessed* was named. It was they who seized upon *The Liberal Imagination* as a handbook of intellectual survival and took lessons on how to give ground on the political front while pretending to upgrade the terms of political discourse. Such a turn to politics in the larger sense announced, as it always does, that politics in the narrower had been defeated. The establishment of taste and sensibility in the place formerly held by justice and progress, coupled with a renewed interest in psychoanalysis as a key to art and a view of the novel as an elixir for weary emotions were new directions for liberal energies, and constituted a program of interior revitalization that was supposed to enrich liberalism through infusions of complexity and depth.

The intellectual strength of such a plan for renovating "the modern will" was also its political weakness, since the effort to rejoin politics and the imagination was made at the expense of politics. As Morris Dickstein now points out, "Somehow Trilling's . . . insistence that the political and literary minds had much to teach each other turned into the notion that they were fundamentally inimical, perhaps because most of the lessons flowed in one direction." By finessing all talk of issues, power and institutions except at the highest levels of abstraction, Trilling could attack the shallowness of liberalism without having to confront the world in which such shallowness seemed, to some at least, to have merit. As a critic of contemporary ideas, Trilling departed from the example of his mentors—Mill, Arnold and Coleridge—in proffering no social ideas of his own, only social sentiments and tastes which did not and could not add up to an alternative liberalism, or, for that matter, an alternative conservatism. His revitalized version of the liberal imagination could never be put to any political tests but only aesthetic ones, in which their validation was assured.

Such an improved liberalism was the elevation of an hypostasized *mind* over circumstances and a thrusting forward of *ideas* against the liberal, and American, conception of reality which is, as he put it, always material reality, "hard, resistant, unformed, impenetrable, and unpleasant." By renovation of the will, Trilling meant something like transcendence or grace, qualities of mind more spiritual than engaged, and standing quite apart from ordinary political categories. Dickstein's observation that Trilling was a "Tory radical" is useful if we understand the radical element to have been largely a genius for manipulating ideas and imagining ever more subtle essences rather than a program of uncovering roots. If radical thought in its customary modern forms is the paring away of "superstructures" in order to lay bare the brute facts of biological need or infantile experience or class interest behind an idea or ideology, then Trilling's brand of radicalism was just the opposite, an upward distillation of the vapors of thought into their rarest and most abstract expressions.

And yet, ever at odds with his own insistent spirituality, Trilling would enter frequent pleas for the conditioned nature of experience and even for biological determinism, especially in the essays that make up *The Opposing Self* (1955) and *A Gathering of Fugitives* (1956). By the mid-1950s, as music master in his own fast game of musical chairs, he was taking the liberals to task for too rare a spirituality, for failing to see "that spirit is not free, that it is conditioned, that it is limited by circumstance." However disorienting this may be to a neophyte in dialectical thought or the tactics of legal reasoning or ordinary ambivalence, it was a characteristic ploy of Trilling's to disavow liberalism in order to adopt and regenerate its categories: the reality principle, the durability of the world, the inexorability of conditions.

Having put aside the vulgar Marxist rhetoric of social determinism which dominated the aesthetic realism of the 1930s, he was prepared, as a Freudian, to assume spokesmanship for the reality principle, conceived of modestly as "the familial commonplace . . . the materiality and concreteness by which it exists, the hardness of the cash and the hardness of getting it, the inelegance and intractability of family things." And though such views would seemingly have brought him into alliance with liberals in acknowledging the harshness of circumstances, he continued to cast a cold eye upon simple theories of environmental conditioning and the blueprints for social engineering to which they gave rise, and indeed upon all organized hopes for social melioration. Here was a Hebraism with a passion for righteousness but little of the accompanying faith in social machinery. Bolstered by Freud's dubious conception of a biological death instinct as a fundamental property of life itself, the tragic view that was first expressed in *The Middle of the Journey* and *The Liberal Imagination*, seemingly in response to the war and the Holocaust, was refined into a metaphysic, taken out of history and made an autonomous property of the modern spirit.

But to go any further into this strange fondness for the conditioned and the circumstantial as it was wedded to a thoroughgoing idealism would take us far afield and get us into the perplexities of the later thought, including a surprising turn against art, which can't be talked about in brief. Trilling's growing impulse to take refuge in reified abstractions, like *mind*, *thought*, *the self* and *the modern will*, which were often locutions for himself, and his continuing efforts to transcend culture while recommending those novels in which it was

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most diligently recorded, and his fondness for a Hegel who promised to lend order to such ambiguities, exfoliated into a vast and airy labyrinth of thought in which his positions became more elusive as the dialectics grew more hermetic and the abstractions more rarefied. *Beyond Culture* (1968) and *Sincerity and Authenticity* (1972) are troubled and troubling books whose difficulties reflect the perplexities of Trilling's own thought and the ambiguities of his own increasingly obscure system of metaphysics and masks. The very title of his last publication in book form, the monograph, *Mind in the Modern World* (1972), bespoke the evanescent mentalism and sense of embattlement that in later years came to dominate his self-conception.

These later books do not appear to have exerted any influence comparable to that of *The Liberal Imagination*, though their prestige may grow at some future time when their exquisite ironies and superb balances can be better appreciated. Though they are brilliant exercises in dialectical reasoning, their brilliance is abstract and cold, and their pose of cultural oppositionism seemingly assumed more from force of habit and a resolute will to be disengaged than from a reasoned assessment of conditions. Unfortunately, certain centers of reaction among the New York intellectuals, notably *Commentary* in its post-Elliot Cohen incarnation, have seized upon Trilling's case against modern culture and in particular against the episode of cultural insurgency in the 1960s that he called "modernism in the streets" to cast a glow of high seriousness upon what is otherwise a strident and rear-guard cultural politics.

To observe Trilling's influence in *Commentary*, where it just now seems most heavily concentrated, is to note how easily his efforts at transcending vulgarity have lent themselves to a *haute vulgarisation* of their own when interpreted without his generosity of spirit. For what can be heard of his ideas when they have been pitched to the level of a cultural cold war betrays little of his modulation, finesse, irony and self-doubt, and rather too much of his anti-Stalinism, his love of the grand formulation, his fretfulness over the manners and morals of the educated middle class and his cultural conservatism. But Trilling's legacy is really another issue entirely, and one that can't be taken up in brief just here.

Indeed, the factor that complicates any assessment of Trilling's legacy is that it is not localized in New York or at Columbia but diffused through academia where it has accompanied his students and been passed on to their students in turn. It may even be thought that Trilling's career was the signal for that dispersal of Jewish energy into the literary profession which precipitated the decline of the New York intellectuals as focal points of intellectual influence, and saw the rise of the English departments and university presses as independent centers of thought after the war. But the radically altered demography of postwar "English" and Trilling's role in it is another subject for another essay, and will have to await in any case a fuller evaluation of his ideas and their cultural meaning in the 1940s and 1950s. □

The Culture of Middle America

THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE. *By Ann Douglas. Alfred A. Knopf. 403 pp. $15.*

LARZER ZIFF

The great English literature of the mid-19th century appeared then and appears now to be a coherent part of the wider culture. *Jane Eyre*, *Vanity Fair* and *David Copperfield*, to name examples, were popular and they were also continuous with the society. They slip neatly into their places on the dense social and geographical maps of their day.

The great American literary works of the same period seemed then and continue to strike one now as being far more discontinuous with their culture. Emerson and Hawthorne achieved esteem rather than popularity, and Melville and Whitman went rather rapidly into popular neglect after some initial notoriety. More importantly, their works do not appear to take up coherent places on the maps of the time but, rather, loom over the flatness like isolated mountains dumped upon a prairie.

We generally account for this impression by recognizing the immature and sparse nature of American culture at that point in its history. There were, after all, none of the rich resources of social stability, none of the nuances of social complexity, none of the accretions of social history on which these first great authors could draw. If we think in terms of cultural maps, then, it is argued, we should see their works not as objects on the chart but as the maps themselves. Accordingly, although with some exceptions to be sure, the best work we have on the literary culture of the period is concerned with the major authors in relative isolation.

But if culture is seen as the distinctive way a people react to the problems of living daily life, then the view that isolates classics is an undernourished one. There was an American culture of some centuries' standing at the time Hawthorne and Melville emerged and if they appear in many ways to be disconnected from it they are to be seen, nevertheless, as of it and in it. The difficulty is that their wider culture makes little or no sense to us after we have registered the observation that it appeared to have had a curious stomach which thrived rather than sickened on a steady diet of sentimentality.

What were the causes of this sentimentalism? Why did people just as intelligent and just as free as we presumably are willingly locate themselves in terms of it? How did it sustain life? Can such questions be addressed without, on one hand, patronizing the past from the fancied superiority of a contemporary viewpoint crammed with modish insights into sex and politics, or, on the other, checking our good sense and our sensibilities at the door and tediously detailing the contents of 101 weepy, popular books?

We have had examples enough of each technique to suspect that the answer is no. But now *The Feminization of American Culture* arrives and the task has been accomplished. Ann Douglas's scope is just and delicate; within it she brings a disarmingly sane sensibility to bear on a great deal of hard-won scholarly evidence. The book is serious, dead serious, and yet is shrewd and breathes good wit and good will. As one reads it the dreadfully familiar barren landscape punctuated by unrelated peaks becomes transformed, and the plain takes on color, foothills rise toward the mountains, and homesteads, roads and herbiage link the features of the scene. We both see it for the first time and yet recognize it—it is the culture of Middle America.

The movement of Douglas's argument has the shape of a horn of plenty, commencing in a tightly confined, highly academic proposition and opening out to a bountiful but controlled account of

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the cultural details to which her initial proposition has led her. The narrow end of the horn is her contention that the growing numbers of middle-class American women who did not hold office or own businesses, who were increasingly exempt from time-consuming domestic responsibilities, who formed the bulk of educated churchgoers and the majority of dependable readers, and who were thus becoming the prime consumers of culture, exerted an influence so powerful on the purveyors of that culture, the liberal ministry (such as Henry Ward Beecher) and the popular writers (such as Nat Willis) as to achieve an alliance that shaped the culture definitively. The term "feminization" is meant to describe this process.

The resulting sentimentalism is analyzed carefully and with an impressive selection of telling details as the women of relative leisure and the sedentary men of religion, uneasy in their detachment from the "masculine" pursuits of their spouses and their peers, melt into one another. The dominant values they imposed upon American culture appear at first glance to be opposed to those of the busy men who brawled along in commerce, industry and politics. And, indeed, that is the way the matter has looked to observers: an abyss opened between private and public, home and politics, feminine and masculine, and those standing on the feminine side of the gap captured the culture with the cash the masculine side supplied. But the particular strength of Douglas's account of this phenomenon lies in her sense of the opposition being only apparent and her penetration to the crucial point at which the two spheres complemented one another.

She writes, "The pressures for self-rationalization of the crudest kind were overpowering in a country propelled so rapidly toward industrial capitalism with so little cultural context to slow or complicate its course; sentimentalism provided the inevitable rationalization of the economic order." Quoted thus, I fear her connection between the two spheres seems a bit rough albeit somewhat defensible. Although attracted to it I confess I gloomily awaited the moment in which it would become the great materialist hay baler, sweeping across the field, cropping the rich evidence, and dumping it off the back in neat, predetermined squares. The moment, however, never arrived. As Douglas's movement widens from a consideration of the changes in institutionalized Protestantism, through a stunning analysis of the age's fascination with and domestication of death, to a shrewd reading of the periodical press that contains the best single account I know of the desperately important and sadly neglected genre, the sketch, all fears of a methodical machine evaporate; an honest and humane intelligence is at work.

Having made her case for the feminization of the culture, Douglas, admirably, does not, as she is entitled to, rest, but somehow finds the stamina and the wit to look beyond the area she has illuminated in order to ask about the fate of the serious thinker and the gifted artist in such a culture, to ask, that is, about the career of romanticism as opposed to sentimentalism. Her consideration takes the form of separate essays on Margaret Fuller and Herman Melville. Now Margaret Fuller, since the institutionalization of women's studies, has become the most unneglected of America's notoriously neglected women and precious little joy her reputation has had of it. One after another humorless and pugnacious writer has overpraised and undervalued her by seeing her career as that of a female genius persecuted by threatened males, both genius and persecution being absolute and unrelenting. In the best essay of recent years on Fuller, Douglas restores her to us by seeing Fuller's career as one of development, and by recognizing the difference in her writing between mere earnestness and actual accomplishment.

An engaging sign of the book's success is the large area of disagreement and supplementation it can permit the reader without loss of its own integrity. I think Douglas's emphasis on the mere fact of church disestablishment is disproportionate; I think Douglas slights the literary problems Melville faced when he tried to activate a democratic hero; and I can think of an abundance of important material that she has not considered; for example, the heavy reliance of writers such as Poe on female correspondents. Yet none of this undermines the achievement.

We all recognize that it is no coincidence that in the 1970s science fiction is enormously popular while a number of our major novelists center their action in worlds of magic. There is such a discrepancy between what we think we are and what is happening to us that the application of the imagination to the everyday seems a fruitless enterprise.

What is perhaps less recognized is that this trend is now finding a parallel

CLOISONNE

Near Kyoto, around 1900,
Perfection was finally achieved
In the shape of a small vase,
Owing something to art nouveau
And much to the Chinese.
Three birds crossing the water—
You might have expected more.

Something like music begins and overtakes you.
Birds embedded in sky
Carry you through glass doors
And over the chained, enamel spume.
You would forget to breathe
Without the wires
Spreading your ribs like wings.

A phosphorescent stranger
(Whose retinae, like yours,
Must once have recorded depth,
Change, roiling water)
Surfaces from beneath the blue glaze
And calls, "There were never such birds.
There is no place like this,
Even beyond Kyoto.

It is chance that these shapes
Resemble your life.
Follow me. You will learn to unsay
Bird, water, sky, love, solitude."
And you begin the flawless descent.

Jane Flanders

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in the writing of history. Doctorow's and Vidal's are not taken as historical novels but as history itself, and a school of historians is emerging who also pursue the apocalyptic. Just as the Biblical exegetes of the post-Reformation saw the New Testament as a fulfillment of the Old, and history, therefore, as the completion of a dreadful symmetry, so these historians see the present as a fulfillment of what the past imagined, a coming together at the point of doomsday.

Ann Douglas, however, believes in history as a continuing dialectic and she renders her belief in her book rather than merely stating it. She draws on the vitality of post-Marxist materialistic theory as a method of opening rather than closing. She draws on her own informed feminist consciousness as a way of understanding and criticizing rather than as a way of combating and deploring. In an excellent section she considers the steps whereby the feminizers of culture replaced the older histories of public men and military deeds with a "biological" history wherein the superiority of the unindividuated commonplace—of being born, giving birth and dying—was affirmed. It takes no great rhetoric to persuade us that such histories were solipsistic nonsense, but Douglas's account of how they came to be, although she makes no reference to the present, cannot fail to remind us of the loss of capacity we suffer when we accept the fantasies of mass culture as a substitute for a sense of the past. Her book is a bulwark against such a loss of capacity. □

Art and Socialist Irrealism

WHITE BOOK. *By Pavel Kohout. George Braziller. 224 pp. $8.95.*

ENOCH BRATER

The work of Pavel Kohout first came to the attention of Broadway audiences last season with Herbert Berghof's production of *Poor Murderer*, a Hamlet play of extraordinary dramatic and psychological intensity. Unlike Tom Stoppard's *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead*, which turns Shakespeare inside out to place major focus on life's minor characters, Kohout examines the precise nature of truth and distortion within the dramatic medium itself. Not since Pirandello has the alternation between illusion and reality been so skillfully translated into theatrical experience. Set in an institute for nervous disorders in the St. Petersburg of 1900, *Poor Murderer* is a play about lunatics, lovers and poets: though they are still "of imagination all compact," the modern world—particularly the post-Dubcek Czechoslovakia Kohout comes from—places gruesome restrictions on Shakespeare's lyrical definitions. Kohout has made repression his major theme. The psychological checkmate of his actor-hero serves as a metaphor for those physical restraints placed on freedom of expression and human dignity.

In *White Book* Kohout breaks the chains of subtle metaphor: political implications no longer hover ominously in the background of psychodrama. The hero of his futuristic novel is Adam Juracek, "conquerer of gravity," who through an exercise of willpower has made man "physically free" by literally surmounting Comrade Newton's law. Levitation, however, is not necessarily compatible with good socialism. "The breaking of such a well-known law," we read in one of the several position papers included in the novel, "was liable to shake confidence in laws generally." Initial confidence in Juracek's uncanny experimentation at the Pedagogical Institute in K., where he serves as professor of drawing and physical education, is quickly undermined by the seasoned bureaucrats who arrive en masse to nip in the bud "Mankind's First Day of Spring."

Anti-gravity is anti-people. Adam, like Galileo, recants. But at the very moment when rehabilitation seems assured, an involuntary levitation before a television camera in a jam-packed auditorium upsets the neat arrangements of backroom party regulars. Natural laws, after all, are not so easily subdued as those made by socialist man. Here "a law once broken ceases to be a law." Adam Juracek, enemy of the people, becomes the unwitting victim of his own anti-gravitational pull. Far better to have kept two feet planted firmly on accepted party ground. Why seek to do battle with that "shithead Newton" anyway?

Up to this point Kohout, one-time editor of the satirical magazine *Dikobraz*, has mastered the pith and punch of traditional political satire. What distinguishes *White Book* is not only the fact that it cannot be published in its own country (the current volume is a translation from the translation into German) but the lengthy Epilogue which places an entirely different light on the satirical acrobatics Kohout performs so deftly in detailing the rise and subsequent fall of Adam Juracek. For here the novel shifts its tone completely: Adam's fall from grace means he is fated to undergo "preventive medical treatment." Repressive regimes have made psychiatric manipulation the rack of the modern inquisition.

Because Kohout moves us so swiftly from methods of political satire to questions of fundamental morality, his novel becomes something more impressive than an item for systematic review. As the first major work to deal with the Soviet-led invasion against the liberal Dubcek government in May 1968, *White Book* comes from behind the barricades to document the shift in political winds which seemed so inexplicably brutal "under Western eyes." Neither polemical nor sentimental, Kohout sets *White Book* in the year 2013 to tell us the true story of something that never happened one March 4 of the century before.

Kohout wrote *White Book* in 1970 as a series of reconstructions, reminiscences, bulletins, addresses, confidential reports, disclaimers, leaflets, personal letters and memoranda. The reader will also discover a carefully worded pastoral letter. Fiction masquerades as history with fantasy rendered as primary source material. Comrade Habl reports that Professor Juracek has presented a case against Sir Isaac Newton's law of the gravitational pull of the earth; Comrade Kreperat proposes that he be placed in a loony bin and the whole thing is finished; Comrade Mares says Professor Juracek has proven his case by ascending to the ceiling of a conference room. Assistant Professors Placenta and Bim (the Stalinist comedian) formulate still other persuasive arguments to confound party officials. Comrade Kreperat responds in despair, "This was our old sickness. We had brought about a revolution in farming and flying to the moon and who knows what else, but when it comes to a crackpot intellectual we fall on our ass." The government declares a state of national emergency.

Through it all Kohout presents a man dedicated to science trying to maintain his humanity. But Adam is ultimately undone by science itself: the strange new science of the mind. His personality is destroyed, reconstructed, destroyed again, reconstructed yet again as a battery of psychiatrists try to put levitation to rest. Adam proves to be

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an impossible case for theoretician and practitioner alike. But a method is eventually found, outdated and very old-fashioned but nonetheless effective: brainwashing. Adam is cured. After decades of treatment, he emerges in the year 2000 knowing only his identification number (141041) but unable to explain what it means. He remembers one item from his former life, the curious fact that "force is proportional to the product of the masses of the two bodies and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them." A general amnesty has been declared by UNO, an international organization dedicated to the Improvement of Human Affairs. Jails, insane asylums and barracks have been "liquidated." Adam is a free man at last. He walks into "a roomy bar where a loud hubbub of voices greeted him." Students of physics celebrate his discovery and in an act of supreme veneration now defiantly walk on the ceiling. Adam's instinct is to join them, but his natural impulse is followed in the next second by a painful cramp "as though lightning had struck and he humbly lowered his gray head." He whispers to himself the "magic spell" of Newton's *Principia*: "Capital F equals k times m one times m two divided by r to the second. . . ." Science in the service of suppression has done its job very well indeed. What is upside down and weightless to the Adam Juraceks of this world is not always what is upside down and weightless to the state.

Beneath this biting satire Kohout never lets us forget the human side of his story. Adam's instincts can be controlled but they will never disappear completely. He is still the one man in the chronicle capable of feeling and spontaneity. Though the state programs him physiologically to recognize that truth "must wait for the right moment" and "a premature truth is under certain circumstances worse than a lie," there will always be other Adams to challenge stupidity and hypocrisy. Even in 2013 social criticism is still being directed at "the writers who once again had provocatively demanded the freedom of speech brusquely denied by the people."

Kohout is one of these writers himself. As one of the principal signers of Charter '77, a human rights petition which appeared in several Western European newspapers in January, Kohout shows us that truth is indeed stranger than fiction. For Kohout, whose works have been banned in Czechoslovakia since 1969, has now been officially accused of working for foreign intelligence sources. "All of us who signed the petition expected some kind of reaction," he said, "but nothing like this. You know, we do not like being called dissidents. We do not like the word. We are not struggling against the regime. We are merely trying to get it to observe existing Czechoslovak laws that guarantee human rights in this country."

In February Vasil Bilak, a national party secretary, blasted the signers of Charter '77 as "anti-state, anti-socialist, and anti-people" and said that they would have to face the consequences of their subversive activities. Kohout, along with playwright Vaclav Havel, novelist Ludvik Vaculik, journalist Jiri Lederer, civil rights leader Frantisek Kriegel, professor of philosophy Jan Palacka, and Jiri Hujek, a former Minister of Education who became Foreign Minister under the Dubcek government, has been repeatedly harassed, arrested, detained, and interrogated. *The New York Times* reported on January 11 that Kohout's wife Jelena received a leg injury while being forcibly taken into custody. The next day Kohout set out to take his wife to the hospital for treatment, but police ordered them out of their car. When Kohout insisted on securing medical aid for his wife, a plain-clothes man began prying at the car door with a crowbar. When Kohout sounded an SOS signal on the car's horn, the police ripped the horn out of the car. The couple surrendered. Kohout was then struck across the face—quite an insult to the man who once served his nation as cultural attaché in Moscow. Later Kohout was served with an eviction notice for the apartment he has occupied for fourteen years.

"What I am undergoing is not pricks but knife stabs," he said. "But that is not important. What is important is the fate of my friends who are still in prison." Asked about his own immediate situation, Kohout has said that as an author whose works can be printed and performed only abroad, he is distressed by having been illegally cut off from mail and telephone services. The only letters being delivered to him as of February were threatening messages in an obviously organized campaign. Though Kohout told one interviewer he was not Jewish, the letters he received were rife with anti-Semitic slogans. Some things have not changed very

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much in Prague, despite the advent of enlightened socialism.

More recently Kohout has been pressed to emigrate. "Were I to do so," he wrote in a moving program note to the New York production of *Poor Murderer* starring Laurence Luckinbill and Maria Schell, "I could spend my whole life going from one opening night to the next and see or even influence the production of all my writing. But I cannot, for the sake of the characters I've created on paper, abandon the people of real flesh and blood, my children, my friends and the audience which remains my audience even though their grandchildren might be the first ones to see my play. They are the ones who share the language in which I write, they generate the love and the hatred for which and about which I write." There have been hundreds of performances of *Poor Murderer* in productions all over Europe and the United States, but Kohout has never seen his own work on the stage. "There is nothing for me to do but go on writing what I will not see, and just wonder why so many statesmen go on pompously signing documents behind which they are unwilling to stand."

Kohout stands behind all of his work. There is much that we in the English-speaking world have still not seen, including *Evol*, *Roulette* and *August, August, August*, the play staged so triumphantly in Vienna in 1976. But what we have seen of Kohout's work sparkles with ingenuity and life. Rising above all political considerations, Kohout writes about individuals caught up in a system beyond their control. For him absurdity is not so much the relatively safe metaphysical fantasy it has become for so many of our best writers but a practical matter of everyday life and death. It is not a problem of coping but of questioning itself. "We live with absurdity, where acknowledged and proven truth is persecuted and the converse is declared to be truth," said Bedrich Utitz, a Prague journalist in exile. "Kohout deals with this absurdity —not only with Socialist irrealism but also with the absurdity he must live with in his homeland." In *White Book* Pavel Kohout makes of political satire a matter of universal conscience, calling our attention to the still unaccomplished goal of making laws protecting human rights as sacred and irrefutable as the law of gravity itself. □

Heretics and Heresies

HERETIC: A Partisan Autobiography. *By Stephen H. Fritchman. Beacon Press. 362 pp. $3.95.*

CAREY McWILLIAMS

What is heresy and who is a heretic? The dictionaries seem to leave no cause for uncertainty: heresy, an opinion or doctrine held in opposition to the orthodox view; ergo, a heretic is one who holds opinions at variance with those "generally received," as the OED puts it. Simple. But suppose the views "generally received," at particular points in time, are perversions or rejections of the real orthodoxy? Isn't majority opinion then heretical? And isn't the "heretic" the real loyalist, the true believer? These and similar questions kept pestering me as I read *Heretic*, Stephen H. Fritchman's lively, highly informative and valuable "partisan autobiography" which, incidentally, is the book bargain of the season at $3.95.

In the conventional sense, Fritchman is a heretic. He admits it; in fact he is proud of it, as the title indicates. After graduating from Ohio Wesleyan he was a Methodist minister briefly but then signed on with the Unitarians, "the Boston religion," which was perhaps his first heresy. After ministries in Petersham, Mass. and Bangor, Maine, he was called to Boston, first to head the Unitarian Youth Commission in 1938 and later, in November 1942, to become editor of *The Christian Register* (founded in 1821). As editor he took the heretical position that a church publication should be more than a house organ; that it should address itself to the major issues of the day. Friends who edited other church papers warned him that he did not understand the unwritten rules and was "riding a company horse" from which he just might be thrown. At first all went well but then even the Unitarians "froze" as the cold war got chillier. Soon the heretic had precipitated what the Boston press dubbed "the Fritchman crisis" in the spring of 1947. The editor was investigated, exonerated on charges of being a "Red," and permitted to carry on but under the close scrutiny of a watchful committee. The arrangement, of course, did not work since Fritchman insisted on tackling sensitive issues relating to the cold war and was soon forced to resign.

Turned out into the cold in 1948, Stephen and Frances Fritchman, both of whom had supported Henry Wallace, got in their car and drove out to what was for them the strange new world of Los Angeles where Fritchman had been named minister of a fascinating institution—one of the rare social landmarks of the community—the First Unitarian Church at 8th and Vermont. It was in 1877, when Los Angeles had a population of 10,000, that Caroline Severance, a heretic if ever there was one, founded the society that became the First Unitarian Church. Severance was a suffragette, believed in birth control, advocated prison reform, welcomed the most diverse views and established the first kindergarten west of the Mississippi. The Fritchmans arrived just as the witch hunt was turning nasty. From the day of his first to his last sermon in 1969 Fritchman preached, practiced and encouraged a variety of heresies at the First Unitarian Church which I.F. Stone accurately described as "a little Gibraltar of resistance to the witch hunt."

On every key issue of the cold war and the witch hunt, Fritchman and his congregation of nonconformists took the unpopular position which, by and large, subsequent history has vindicated. Time was when I knew or thought I knew by name the 1,200-odd members of the congregation. They were—and still are—as fine a mix of independent nonconformists as you will meet west of Denver: pacifists, Socialists, Communists, Trotskyites, Keynesians, single-taxers, labor organizers, free thinkers, vegetarians, visionaries, anarchists, civil libertarians, consciousness-raisers in many fields: in a word, heretics. With remarkable consistency and courage, the congregation backed Fritchman on the stands he took. What the First Unitarian Church has meant as a haven of free speech, a nursery for unpopular ideas, and a refuge for political and social pariahs, is a story well and fairly told, with a wealth of detail, in *Heretic*.

One major incident—of dozens touched on—points up the importance of having a few heretics about by way of saving so-called conservatives from their own follies. In 1950, when the witch hunt was at its nuttiest, state Assemblyman Harold Levering—representing the rich ghetto of Bel-Air—secured enactment of a measure which obliged the state tax collector to disallow tax exemption to churches unless they made a declaration each year, under oath, that the church and its officers did not advo-

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cate the overthrow of the government "by force and violence." Two years later the measure was made part of the state Constitution by a 2-to-1 vote of the California electorate. To its eternal credit, the congregation at First Unitarian promptly refused to file the test oath and thereby placed the church's tax exemption on a most valuable piece of Los Angeles real estate in jeopardy. And it took the initiative, supported by one or two other churches, in making an expensive court test of the Levering Act. The measure was upheld by the state Supreme Court but on June 30, 1958 in a 7-to-1 decision the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it was unenforceable. (Chief Justice Earl Warren did not participate because he had signed the act as Governor, one of several incidents in his California experience that he was reticent to discuss in his memoirs.) In retrospect, it is truly amazing that the major church organizations—Protestant, Catholic and Jewish—failed to sense the danger implicit in the act or were reluctant to challenge it. Later some church leaders said they had wanted to join in the action but that their members disapproved. But the members might have had more respect for them as leaders if they had sallied out to seek the adversary rather than, in Milton's phrase, protecting "a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed." Few incidents better illuminate the politics of redbaiting than the Levering Act controversy which is dealt with definitively in this important coda to the witch hunt.

So just who, then, are the real heretics? Doesn't the First Amendment clearly state that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"? Did not this provision reflect a long and turbulent experience with test oaths and similar measures? Today the major church groups in California would no doubt readily concede they made a mistake in walking away from what should have been a firm commitment to the First Amendment. But isn't apostasy a form of heresy? Haven't the views of a whole pack of heretics (Parker, May, Garrison, Channing, Thoreau and Emerson) on "human rights" come to be accepted as official American doctrine? And weren't their views simply a reflection and extension of the original political orthodoxy? Heretics they may have been in their time, but they cannot be fairly accused of having rejected the original revolutionary vision. And isn't it reasonable to regard them not merely as prophets but as spokesmen for what they perceived to be the real thrust and meaning of the bold pronouncements of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights?

Fritchman tells us that he never learned "to sing, to dance, to ride a horse, or to sail a boat" but somewhere along the route to Los Angeles he learned, in Mencken's words, how to "shake up the animals." He has probably been at the center of more controversies than any minister of his time not excepting William Sloane Coffin, a heretic of the cold-war years who was recently approved as minister of New York's prestigious Riverside Church. Today one reads *Heretic* not so much for its heresies as for the light it throws on cold-war majorities that, in panic, fear, confusion and self-interest, denied the classic American political pronouncements and opted for a spurious ideology—temporarily. But as has happened so often in the past, the heretics seem to have triumphed in the end. □

THEATRE / Harold Clurman

During the intermission of the Kabuki performance recently given at the Beacon Theatre (Broadway and 74th St.), I heard a woman remark, "It's like seeing Shakespeare." I could not tell whether she meant she cared for the Kabuki plays as little as she did for Shakespeare's or simply that both Kabuki and Shakespeare were "stylized" theatre, thus esoteric and difficult.

Kabuki and Shakespeare are not alike even stylistically. Shakespeare is much closer to realism, the heroic realism of England's 16th and 17th centuries. Kabuki, a product of the same period in Japan, though based, like all art, on the modulations of living experience ("life" itself), is as far from realism as any theatre since the Greeks—except for the earlier No.

Stylization and nonrealism in general are modes removed from the *appearance* of "real life"—though for all that the life of the imagination is as real as any other. The attraction of Kabuki, apart from the sheer pleasure of its playfulness, stems from its Eastern moral and religious ideas: concepts of honorable behavior, piety and love. One of the "numbers" on the recent bill dealt with filial devotion, though here it was a fox that exemplified that virtue; another dealt with forgiveness or redemption from the most horrible of crimes, but the demon who is exorcised through Buddhist religion is first depicted in the guise of an old woman.

The content in *Kabuki* (the term may be translated as song-dance-skill) is conveyed in a manner entirely foreign to all Western theatrical tradition. Like the classic Greek, Kabuki is "total theatre"—as are most of the oldest theatre forms—but it is alien to the imitation of both gods and human beings. Kabuki is closer to the representation of puppets than to ordinary mortals. (Puppeteering is the first Japanese theatre form.) That is one reason for the "strangeness" of Kabuki, another is its slowness. (No is much slower.) The movement of Kabuki begins in stillness; the action proceeds from the initial quietude.

I would test the acuity of a spectator's theatrical perception through his or her capacity to observe with due sensibility the acting in Kabuki and *a fortiori* in No. For the acting in Kabuki —more "realistic" than in No—is, for all its connection with dance, true acting. It is evident just as much in the quiet, quasi-immobile, often extraordinarily protracted movements as in the occasionally explosive warriorlike gesticulations and leaps that may follow.

Because Kabuki is not only archaic in language but remote from the developments in contemporary Japan (films and the ever increasing repertory of Western and Western-inspired drama) Kabuki is becoming obsolete. (A Tokyo taxi driver told me he could not understand it.) In order to preserve it, the form has, ever since the 19th century, acquired accretions or alloys of modern entertainment values that reflect our more nervous age of acceleration.

No, the art of the nobility in the 15th century, tends to induce a sense of timelessness, a realm of the supernal; Kabuki, the art of the later wealthy mercantile class, is more mundane and thus somewhat closer to our comprehension. In the latest Kabuki performances what the new Japanese and Western audiences are most likely to enjoy are the acrobatic feats or stunts.

Ennosuke Ichikawa III, the star of the company's recent visit, offers us an opportunity to observe a fusion of the old and the new Kabuki. The actor, who plays a man, a woman and the "fox" mentioned above, possesses the bodily pliancy and control needed for Kabuki acting. His magic entrances and exits are not only scenic surprises but extraordinary physical displays, all the more

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exhilarating because of the delicacy and modulation of gesture from which they spring.

Still this is not the core or "flower" of Ichikawa's art, nor in general of the best in Kabuki acting. There is the subtlest kind of characterization—vocally, in facial expression, in mimetics and in tiny as much as in broad movements, which tend, as does most Japanese art, toward asymmetrical beauty. Ichikawa's dance as the old woman has a grace and artfulness, suggesting a hypocritical and malign intention which seems even more amazing with the shock of the creature's subsequent transformation into the boomingly fearsome fiend hidden in the old woman. And what charm there is, coupled with pathos, in the "fox" true to the memory and forever at the service of his mother and father.

There are other excellent players in the company, there are wonderful costumes (the simplest are the most beautiful) and a host of formalized conventions which are most piquant in their "novelty" for us, together with music, some of it bruising in its dramatic emphasis, and some touching like a soughing lament of nature.

One might say that Kabuki is chiefly for theatrical epicures, but I am more inclined to assert that the person who finds no pleasure in Kabuki has no real taste for *theatre*.

Miss Margarida's Way is the work, as author and director, of Roberto Athayde, born in Rio de Janeiro in 1929, educated in Brazil, Argentina, Paris and at the University of Michigan. His is a promising talent (Ambassador Theatre).

I use the rather stale epithet ("promising") for, while the biographical note in the theatre's program lists Athayde's novels, plays, short stories and musical accomplishments, I have mixed feelings about *Miss Margarida's Way*, though I should add that it has had fifty-five different productions in such diverse places as Paris, Athens, Spoleto and San Francisco. It has also delighted packed houses at the Public Theatre, its New York point of origin.

On the surface, the play struck me as a variation on the theme of Ionesco's *The Lesson*, which some have taken to be the difficulty in human communication, but which I view as the brutality of certain modes of education. (In *The Lesson* a private professor murders his pupils.) In *Miss Margarida's Way*, a woman teacher at a secondary school who addresses her opening class with an air of saccharine tenderness for her students soon reveals herself as a vixen of monstrous perversity, or just plain crazy.

Her praise of learning is peppered by abuse, vile sexual references, extreme contempt for everyone, violence and hysterical mania. She finally becomes the victim of her own aberrations, and we last see her exhausted or dead in the arms of one of her students whom she repeatedly invites to join her on her podium and then insults for responding to her call. One of my critical colleagues sees this final "tableau" as a reverse *Pietà*. The boy, though she has humiliated him, loves the whacky dame. Maybe so.

The play has also been set down as a lampoon of fascism, which always presents itself at first as benevolent and utterly devoted to the (captive) people, and then goes on to the most hideously repressive authoritarianism, eventually carrying destructiveness to the point of self-destruction. This interpretation may also be held valid. It appears that in Brazil the play was regarded as definitely subversive of the regime: the police closed it after it had run there for five weeks.

All this makes the play "interesting." I doubt, however, that the reasons for the audience's patent enjoyment of it have much to do with the above interpretations. They simply revel in the lunacy of the spectacle, the arrant obscenity of its attitudes and vocabulary, and last but not least in Estelle Parsons's blazing performance.

Call it, if you like, a play of the Absurd. I found it too long; the joke, whatever its implications, was finished for me after forty minutes. Perhaps the writer as director found the extension of the material necessary so that it might mount to the required paroxysm. But by that time I had become indifferent. Then, too, I found quite apt the request made by my guest of the evening that I explain why so many present-day dramatists write skits rather than plays. I shall not undertake that job now, but it is true that *Miss Margarida's Way* is a flaming skit in need of abbreviation.

It arouses hilarity as it bursts upon us with Miss Margarida's first transition from ultra-sweetness to filthy rage. There are several very funny bits of action—one of which involves the symbolic use of scissors—and some well-handled improvisations by the indomitable Estelle Parsons.

Her thunderbolt energy, the gusto of her virtuosity, the high color in her exasperation and her basic health, all make her playing something one cannot fail to like. It corresponds to the style of the writing. Yet I wondered, as I watched her, whether there might not be some advantage in casting the performance in another key: as a more "normal," less "technicolored" cartoon. At least I would like to see someone try the role that way. But perhaps the author as director was more knowing in presenting his dynamic sketch in the full blast of its absurdity. □

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

ACROSS

1 and 10 Foreign flow associated with efforts to make big business. (10)
4 One might be so caught with a crew on the far left. (3-6)
9 The heights of poetry and music? (9)
10 See 1 across
11 Rereading an arrangement—one of two that Heine (and Schubert) wrote? (9)
12 A Latin politician who brings back everything to you and me. (5)
13 Is this drunk only by the nicest people? (10)
17 Priestly acts are old, and thoroughly confused. (10)
21 Hamlet's source of irritation in a couple of articles belonging to the Dutch. (5)
22 With it, one girl is found hanging about here. (9)
23 Rhythmical accent is part of the conflict, usually. (5)
24 It's the way to do things! (9)
25 Perhaps watch for an article in a news magazine? (9)
26 They might have several hundred feet of film of national dances. (5)

DOWN

1 One might so challenge a mischief-maker with a disassembled gun. (6)
2 Did one's best to mend the damned thing, euphemistically! (6)
3 Phony article put together by a medicine man. (6)
4 One would be stupid to try it, hoping to hear a click. (7,8)
5 Talk about a clique! If you do, you do, to go around like this! (8,1,6)
6 Painting is something a little shaky, but aesthetically pleasing. (8)
7 An upside-down parrot, for example, allows little bits of it. (8)
8 What the orchestra does in breaking up? (8)
14 Does one have to try hard to be such a writer? (8)
15 It's a small measure to you and me and the cat, but you have to get used to things like this. (8)
16 What you do to fast in the morning, and eat a little bit later? (That's what marriage sometimes does!) (6,2)
18 Not so fat, but if a shoe is close, this is better. (6)
19 Part of the patter is queer, and slightly naughty. (6)
20 A way out of things for the same group that we said use 13. (6)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1693

ACROSS: 1 Shrinking violet; 9 Asphalt; 10 Expiate; 11 Loathe; 12 Stigmata; 14 Watermelon; 15 Bead; 17 Also; 19 Horsewoman; 22 Long-hair; 23 Itself; 25 Oceanic; 26 Omitted; 27 Take it lying down. DOWN: 1 Swallow-tail coat; 2 Replant; 3 Neatherd; 4 Iota; 5 Guesthouse; 6 Impugn; 7 Leakage; 8 The Garden of Eden; 13 Demoniacal; 16 Swatting; 18 Sun deck; 20 Maestro; 21 Shansi; 24 Yogi.

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